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Abstract  
 
With regards to social constructivism, this project explores the effects of private military and security 
companies on states’ authority and their provision of security. A core aspect of legitimate state 
authority is the monopoly of violence, which the military is understood as being the practical 
extension of. The effect on states monopolization of violence, and consequently state authority, when 
the provision of security has been outsourced to private military and security companies becomes 
relevant while working with the security dimension of the social contract. 
Based on empirical data from the United States, Japan and Sierra Leone, we argue for some 
observable generalisations regarding the effects on the social contract in relation to security, and 
consequently states’ authority, when outsourcing the provision of security to private military and 
security companies.  
We have found that, as such, states’ reliance on private military and security companies does not 
significantly affect states’ authority, and subsequently the provision of security, in neither the United 
States nor Japan. However, there are some implications within Sierra Leone, in which the social 
contract in relation to security was affected by the Sierra Leonean state’s use of private military and 
security companies. Generally, it was observed that by outsourcing military functions to private 
military and security companies, a new actor entered into the provision of civil society’s security. 
While the state’s monopoly of violence is partially being eroded, it does not necessarily entail that 
the authority of states are affected. Rather, a monopsy of violence is established.  
On the basis of historic and cultural trends within each case study, we argue that the social contract 
in relation to security needs to be analysed in a country-specific context. By arguing that the social 
contract in relation to security is country-specific, it is also argued that the use of private military and 
security companies does not warrant the same effects on states’ authority among all states, but rather 
that this requires further investigation on a country-by-country basis. Lastly, this project also 
discusses the implications on states’ authority while part of an international society in which states 
interact with international organisations, non-governmental organisations and private firms. When 
utilising a social constructivist framework, it is argued that states are becoming increasingly 
international and, as such, should be investigated in a national as well as in an international context.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Problem Area 
In today’s interconnected and globalized world, a given state is never isolated from the rest of the 
world – it is always and already enmeshed in a whole range of globalizing processes and relationships. 
This is no less the case in regards to the field of security. Tainted by “globalized insecurity”1, no state 
can today act, or react, as a sole actor in the international system: “The conditio humana cannot be 
understood nationally or locally, but only globally”.2 Insecurities such as terrorism, climate change 
and the financial crisis know no territorial boarders, making the state, perhaps forcefully, linked to 
the rest of the world. Whether the conditio humana since the beginning of the 21st century is to be 
understood as a proof of globalisation or if it is simply a reoccurrence of earlier developments is 
something that is widely debated among scholars. Some scholars arguing for globalisation, emphasise 
that “The nation state is pressured ´from above´ in the sense that globalisation creates cross-border 
activities which states are no longer able to control on their own”3, and, at the same time states are 
pressured from below because of the increasing tendency to identify with the local instead of the 
national or global.4 Arguing against globalisation as a new phenomenon, globalisation-sceptics 
emphasises that the world today is still tainted by power struggles, many of which are centred around 
states, and thereby largely this suggest a continuation of previous epochs.5  
However, the interconnectedness between states, whether it is a result of power struggles or 
globalisation, has been, among other things, affected by an introduction of neo-liberal blueprints since 
the 1980s, commonly referred to as the “Washington consensus”. Within this tendency, a 
commitment to privatisation and the “minimal state”, as seen in Great Britain under the Thatcher 
administration and in the United States under the Reagan administration, is prevalent. Throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, the Washington Consensus dominated economic relations with an emphasis on 
“Free trade, capital market liberalization, flexible exchange rates […] the transfer of assets from the 
public to the private sector”.6 
                                                             
1 Held, D. & McGrew, A. (2007) ”Globalisation/Anto-globalisation” 2nd  edition, Polity Press: p. 43 
2 Beck, U. (2002) “The Cosmopolitan Society and its enemies” in Theory, Culture and society, Vol. 19 (1-2), p. 17 
3 Jackson, R & Sørensen, G. (2013) “ Introduction to International Relations, Theories and approaches” Oxford 
University Press 5th edition, p.198 
4 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2013) p.198 
5 Held, D. & McGrew, A. (2007) p. 49 
6 Held, D. & McGrew, A. (2007) p.187-8 
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The privatisation discourse has also affected security: “Neo-liberal economic policies and ideologies 
have been key aspects facilitating the expansion of security services in both national and global 
markets”.7 Throughout the 1990s, the number of private security providers exploded, with private 
firms training “militaries in more than forty-two countries”.8  Furthermore, since 1990 “every multi-
lateral peace operation conducted by the UN”9 has included private military and security companies 
(hereafter referred to as PMSCs). With the fall of the Berlin wall, and subsequently the end of the 
Cold War, a “security gap”10 was created due to the increasing insecurity in the global environment. 
The security gap created an increasing supply of soldiers to be enrolled in PMSCs, as well as a 
demand for PMSCs from “[…] states, international organizations, NGOs, global corporations, and 
wealthy individuals”11. 
Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the dominant paradigm in the international system has 
regarded “[…] the legitimate use of violence as being the domain of the modern state, which, as a 
natural consequence, delegitimizes non-state providers of security. Legitimacy is, therefore, tied to 
the formal state”12. With the rise of neo-liberal policies, and consequently the privatisation of 
violence, a change in the monopoly of violence has occurred, “[…] whereby security becomes a 
service to be bought and sold in the market place and a commodity capable of being globally 
exported.”13 The monopoly of violence, therefore, is no longer solely tied to the state, and instead 
security has become a “…private commodity, rather than a public good.”14 When security becomes 
a private commodity, it results in what Abrahamsen and Williams terms ´responsibilization´ where 
“[…] responsible individual and corporate behavior entails […] engaging the service of a security 
company.”15 This has, along with the neo-liberal privatization discourse and structural changes after 
the Cold War, resulted in a re-emergence of private military and security actors in states security 
provision. Manifested in private military and security companies, the outsourcing and privatization 
of security and military has an intricate relationship with states’ authority. States’ monopoly on 
                                                             
7 Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2011) “Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politcs” 
Cambridge University Press p: 13 
8 Avant, D.D. (2005) “The Market for Force, The Consequences of Privatizing Security” Cambridge University Press, 
p. 8 
9 Avant, D.D. (2005) p. 7 
10 Singer, P.W. (2008) “Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatised Military Industry” Cornell University Press, p. 
49  
11 Williams, P.D. (2008) “Security Studies: An Introduction” 2nd edition, Routledge, p. 428 
12 Mandrup, T. (2012) “Privatisation of Security: The Concept Its History and Its Contemporary Applications” Royal 
Danish Defence College p. 8 
13 Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2011) p. 76 
14 Avant, D.D. (2005) p. 4 
15 Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2011) p. 67 
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violence, inherent in states’ authority, becomes contested by outsourcing the provision of security to 
PMSCs. In lieu with the security dimension of the social contract, the responsibility of states becomes 
the provision of security to civil society. When outsourcing the provision of security to PMSCs, the 
question then becomes if states disclaim their responsibility towards civil society. 
The privatisation of security has resulted in a debate among scholars regarding how the privatisation 
of violence and security affects the authority of states. Anne Leander (2006) argues, that privatisation 
of warfare and the monopoly on violence “[…] does raise issues of state authority”16, whereas 
Abrahamsen & Williams (2009) argues for a “re-articulation of the public/private and global/local 
distinctions and relationship”17 within what they term “global security assemblages”. They further 
argue for a move away from what they see as “[…] the weakness of seeing the rise of private security 
as an erosion of state power and authority”18.  
Along with the debate about how and if states’ authority is affected by the re-emergence of private 
military and security actors in security provision, a debate about how other international actors, such 
as International Organisations (hereafter referred to as IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations 
(hereafter referred to as NGO) affect states’ authority is also taking place among scholars. The 
question then becomes if IOs affect states’ authority in the same manner as PMSCs, and if this has to 
do with the fact that PMSCs are related to the security provision and are thereby marked by a 
“life/death” discourse.  
 
 
  
                                                             
16 Leander, A. (2006) “Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the Legitimate Use of Force” 
Rubbettino, p. 8 
17 Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2009) “Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International 
Politics” International Political Sociology (3), p. 1 
18 Abrahamsen, R & Williams, M.C. (2009) p. 1 
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1.2 Problem formulation 
These considerations have led us to the following problem formulation:  
How does the use of PMSCs affect states’ authority and the provision of security? 
In this project we understand the monopoly of violence as an inherent function of the state, and thus 
as an expression of state authority. The military as a state institution is responsible for the practical 
provision of national security. The provision of security is an inherent role of the state, and it is set 
forth by the social contract in relation to security between a state and its citizens. Therefore, the 
following research questions revolve around these considerations.    
1.3 Research Questions 
In order to answer the problem formulation, the following research questions will be investigated:  
1. How is the social contract in relation to security conceptualised in this project?  
2. What characterises PMSCs and how have they been used throughout time? 
3. What is the nature of the social contract in relation to security provision in the United States, 
Sierra Leone and Japan? 
4. How are PMSCs used by the United States, Sierra Leone and Japan? 
5. Does international actors, exemplified by International Organisations, affect states’ authority 
in the same manner as PMSCs?  
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1.3 Current debate in relation to the effect privatization of security 
To situate the main argument of this project we will in this section outline the current debate in the 
realm of privatization of security.  
When discussing the privatization of security, Avant (2005) argues that “[…]’national’ security has 
become difficult to distinguish from international or global security and the lines between internal 
and external security have blurred.”19 The blurred lines between internal and external security have 
made it difficult for states to supply security to the public“[…] because of the scale of the goods 
people demand is different from the scale of the nation-state.”20 The dependence on the private 
military and security industry is touched upon by Singer (2001/02): “With the continued growth and 
increasing activity of the privatized military industry, the start of the twenty-first century is witnessing 
the gradual breakdown of the Weberian monopoly over the forms of violence.”21 However, to declare 
that states as an organizational structure is in fact disappearing due to states’ decreased monopoly on 
violence is, according to Singer (2001/02), too premature.22 Therefore, Avant (2005) and Singer 
(2001/02) both argue that there is in fact a “market for force”, and that this can be seen, in part, as a 
result of the neo-liberal policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, how and if the state’s 
authority is effected by the “market for force” is widely contested.  
Globalisation and the emergence of many supranational and multinational organisations has, 
according to Anna Leander (2001), led to “[…] the dual effects of displacing politics and of diffusing 
authority, thereby diminishing the states legitimacy and capacity to monopolise violence 
respectively”23. Furthermore, Leander (2001) argues that the increasingly international point of view 
in regards to political boundaries and the “[…] privatisation of formerly public regulation”24 leads to 
a weakening of the claim of states on the monopoly of violence. Additionally, Leander (2001) argues 
that, when the political process is taken over by non-state actors, it proposes a challenge to “[…] the 
capacity of public authorities to preserve and use the state’s monopoly of violence”25. These non-
                                                             
19 Avant, D.D. (2005) p. 33 
20 Avant, D.D. (2005) p. 32 
21 Singer, P.W. (2001/02) “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for 
International Securty” Internationaal security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter, 2001-2002) pp. 187 
22 Singer, P.W. (2001/02) p. 187 
23 Leander, A. (2001) “Globalisation and the Eroding State Monopoly of Legitimate Violence” Working papers 24/2001 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute p. 2 
24 Leander, A. (2001) p. 2  
25 Leander, A. (2001) p. 3    
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state actors, such as PMSCs, do not enhance the security of society; instead, “[…] the market for 
force created by increased reliance on PMCs weakens the foundation of public security.”26  
In line with Anna Leander, P.W. Singer (2008) points out that; “When a government delegates out 
part of its role in national security through the recruitment and maintenance of armed forces, it is 
abdicating an essential responsibility.”27 It ‘dishonours’ this responsibility because “The essential 
belief is that security is a ‘fundamental public service’ that requires a ‘special public trust’. Thus, a 
general feeling is that those who carry out its core missions should be responsible to the public and 
not to other entities.28” Singer argues that when the public protection is provided through private 
means, the citizens in a society no longer enjoy security by right of their membership in a state. 
Instead, their security comes to depend on a confluence of PMSCs.29 However, as J. Pattison (2010) 
argues “[…] a state can be legitimized even though it acts as an intermediary between the provider 
of protection (such as a PMSC or another state) and its citizens.”30 States do therefore not need to 
hold the sole monopoly on violence. In fact, “If it is not necessary that the state possesses a monopoly 
over the provision of military force, must it have a ‘monopsony’ over the use of military force? In 
other words, does the social contract require the state to be the sole consumer of force?”31  
Contrary to Leander (2001), Abrahamsen & Williams (2011) argue that even though the emergence 
of PMSCs has affected states’ authority “[…] it is not necessarily weakened.”32 Abrahamsen and 
Williams (2011) argue that states often play an important role in the process of privatisation. 
Therefore, the privatization of security is not eroding the power or authority of the state33, rather, the 
security “[…]proliferation is linked to changes inside the state, and its power stems not primarily 
from the barrel of the gun but from its embeddedness in contemporary structures of governance and 
its links to public forms of power and authority.”34 Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) instead argue 
for an emergence of “global security assemblages”35 within which security structures are at the same 
time “[…]public and private, global and local.”36 These “global security assemblages” result in 
                                                             
26 Leander, A. (2005) “The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military 
Companies” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 42, no. 5 p. 606  
27 Singer, P.W. (2008) p.226.  
28 Singer, P.W. (2008) p.226.  
29 Singer, P.W. (2008) p.226. 
30 Pattison, J. (2010), p. 436. 
31 Pattison, J. (2010), p. 436.  
32Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2011) p. 3 
33 Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2011) p. 81 
34 Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2011) p. 3 
35 Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2011) p. 3 
36 Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2011) p. 3 
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“[…]new practices and forms of power that cannot be neatly contained within the geographical 
boundaries of the nation state.”37 Furthermore, Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) argue that neo-
liberalism is one of the key forces behind this privatisation, and that the “[…]same forces have also 
informed and spurred the transformation of developing societies and states in ways that make them 
more open to, and in need of, private security provision.”38 Therefore, states actually benefit from 
the collaboration with private military and security actors.  
These are just some of the aspects of the debate regarding the privatisation of security, and how 
privatization of security affects states’ authority. It is interesting to note that all of the mentioned 
scholars recognize the emergence of private security as a trend that affects states. This is the common 
starting point – instead what is widely debated relates to how and if the privatization of security erodes 
the authority of a state. Departing from Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) and their notion of the 
importance of both the local and global levels, this project seeks to investigate how and if states’ 
authority is affected differently within diverse states in relation to the security dimension of the social 
contract. We argue that the effects emanating from the privatization of security cannot be researched 
objectively but must rather be understood as constructs based on the history and culture of each state.    
.    
1.4 Outline of The Project  
 
In the preceding problem area we have explained how a confluence of factors following the Cold War 
and alongside globalization has been instrumental in amplifying the pace of privatization of war. 
Especially the surplus of military personnel after the Cold War, the promotion of neoliberal policies 
up through the 1980s and 1990s and new international security threats have contributed to the rise of 
the private military and security industry. In the problem area we have highlighted why it is important 
and relevant to examine PMSCs impact on state’s authority. The problem area has helped frame and 
introduce our problem formulation. In the following chapters we will elaborate on the main concepts 
set forth in the problem formulation. In order for us to structure the project we have formulated five 
research questions that will structure our analysis and our discussion.    
                                                             
37 Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2011) p. 3 
38 Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2011) p. 13 
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Before we turn to our working definitions of the core concepts, PMSCs and the social contract in 
relation to security, that we employ in our analysis we will discuss the ontological and 
epistemological framework of this work. We will provide an overview of the methodology employed 
in this project and how our ontological and epistemological stance has influenced our findings.   
In order to assess whether the use of PMSCs has had a significant effect on state’s authority it becomes 
pertinent that we first define what characterizes PMSCs. We will present our conceptualization of the 
social contract and how this understanding of the social contract as a historic and cultural construct 
impacts the provision of security. We have chosen to focus on three states that are quite distinct 
historically, culturally and politically. By highlighting these three case studies; Japan, the United 
States and Sierra Leone we point out that the social contract is country-specific and not a static 
concept that can be applied to any state disregarding culture and history.  
In each case study we will focus on what the social contract has looked like historically. We will also 
focus on what the nature of the military is, as well as what the relationship is between the military, 
civil society and the state. The assessment of the relationship between the state, its military and civil 
society will enable us to uncover what the effects of PMSCs into the provision of security is and how 
that subsequently impacts on the state authority.      
Finally, we will conclude by following up on the main findings in the case studies and in order to 
broaden the discussion of states’ authority we will turn to international organizations. The reason for 
why we find it relevant to assess what impact IO’s have on states’ authority is that in the research 
literature it is discussed whether IO’s undermine states’ authority. Our question becomes if IO’s affect 
states’ authority in another way than PMSCs, and whether IO’s impact is more significant than that 
of the PMSCs.  
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Ontology  
Broadly speaking “…ontology is about how this world is actually put together”39; hence, what reality 
looks like. There are two central ways of viewing reality: 1) reality is made up by “…objective 
entities”40 which is “…external to social actors”41 and, 2) reality is viewed as a social construction 
“…built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors”42. The first way of viewing reality is 
commonly referred to as objectivism and the second as constructionism.  
Objectivistic ontology holds that reality exists independently of social actors. This implies that reality 
exists outside the realm of social actors and can thus be observed and measured objectively43. Social 
actors have no impact on reality – reality is then, so to say, “out there”.  
Constructionist ontology on the other hand holds that society is a concept that exists only in the minds 
of social actors – that is individuals, communities, institutions, states etc. Constructionist ontology 
“…does not believe this world has any kind of essence or nature, but rather that it is a social and 
linguistic construction”44. Reality, or the world, is therefore a social construction, constructed by the 
interactions between social actors. The conduction of research is per definition “… a conceptual 
object qua science, ideology and the way in which we ask questions”45. This means that no “firm” 
objectively observable concepts like “the economy”, “international law” or “social contract” exist.  
The nature of our problem formulation and our research questions comply us to utilize a 
constructionistic ontology whilst arguing our case. The core concept in our research is “the social 
contract”. We argue that this concept is socially constructed and receives its meaning from social 
interactions and historical contexts. “The social contract” as a concept only exists in the minds of 
social actors, and thus does not exist prior to human interaction. 
                                                             
39 Olsen, P.B. & Pedersen, K. (2008) Problem-Oriented Project Work, 2nd edition, Roskilde University Press,  p. 150  
40 Bryman, A (2012) Social Research Methods, 4th edition, Oxford University Press, p. 32 
41 Bryman, A. (2012) p. 32 
42 Bryman, A. (2012) p. 32 
43 Bryman, A. (2012) p. 33 
44 Olsen, P.B. & Pedersen, K. (2008) p. 151 
45 Olsen, P.B. & Pedersen, K. (2008) p.151 
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2.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology is concerned with knowledge; what knowledge is and how we can obtain knowledge. 
There are, broadly speaking, two distinct directions within epistemology – positivism and 
interpretivism. 
Positivism in the social sciences has been greatly influenced by the way the natural sciences conduct 
science46, and it is therefore generally believed that the methods used in the natural sciences should 
be applied to obtain knowledge about the social reality. According to the positivist epistemology, 
knowledge is only true knowledge when it is “…confirmed by the senses”47; hence value-free and 
objective48. Positivism sets out to explain society and looks for cause-effect relationships. This, along 
with a strong emphasis on value-free, objective and neutral knowledge, aligns positivism with an 
objectivistic ontology. The positivist researcher distances herself from the object in question and thus 
retains a level of independence.   
Contrary to positivism, interpretivism holds that social science is “…fundamentally different 
from…natural science”49, therefore, the methods used to obtain (true) knowledge about the social 
world must necessarily be different from the natural sciences. Interpretivism’ aim is what Max Weber 
called “Verstehen”50 – gaining an understanding of the social world. The researcher seeks to explore 
society, and thereby obtain knowledge about the inner workings of society. Knowledge is thus 
contextual and value loaded; thus the researcher is not separated from the research object. Therefore, 
the knowledge that the researcher obtains will never be truely objective because it is tainted by the 
researcher’ own values, views and experiences. 
Interpretivism functions as an umbrella under which other epistemologies are situated: symbolic 
interactionism, hermeneutics, social constructivism, and post-structuralism to name a few. An 
interpretivist epistemological stance is compatible with constructionist ontology due to the shared 
understanding that society and social reality is not objectively observable, and that social actors 
impose meaning on social reality. Reality and knowledge is therefore to be understood as products of 
social actors. 
                                                             
46 Bryman, A. (2012) p. 27 
47 Bryman, A. (2012) p. 28 
48 Bryman, A (2012) p. 28 
49 Bryman, A. (2012) p. 28 
50 Bryman, A. (2012) p. 29 
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In line with our ontological position, we deem social constructivism to be the most compatible 
epistemological stance for our study.  
Social constructivism holds that “…the social world is not a given: it is not something “out there” 
that exists independently of the thoughts and ideas of the people involved in it”51. According to 
positivist theories, the social reality is made up of “matter” and the fundamental relationships of 
society are given meaning by their material base. Opposed to the materialist understanding of society, 
social constructivism emphasizes how concepts are constituted by ideas and perceptions52. This 
implies that concepts like weapons, armies, power, territories and other material matter is not in itself 
“important”, but the meaning, which has been assigned to these concepts by social actors, is 
significant53.  Therefore, the knowledge we are able to obtain about reality is influenced and 
constructed by the social interactions between social actors.  
However, there are some limitations to social constructivism. When knowledge is dependent on social 
interaction, the knowledge obtainable becomes restricted to the senses, feelings, experiences and so 
on, possessed by social actors. These experiences, feelings etc. lay the foundation upon which social 
actors create/construct images/knowledge and act upon it, and thus these constructions become their 
subjective reality.  
We have chosen a social constructivist epistemology because, as argued earlier, “the social contract” 
is a socially constructed concept and as social actors, we assign meaning to concepts. We construct 
our reality around our experiences etc. – but the sum of our experiences, knowledge etc. keeps 
changing, and new experiences and feelings are added. This implies that “everything” is subject to 
change. “The social contract” is not a static concept, but instead an intermediated concept that is 
influenced by the sum of experiences possessed by social actors.   
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2.3 Research approach 
There are three overall research approaches – inductive, deductive and abductive.  
The key tenet of deductive research is that one infers from an existing theory or just “…theoretical 
consideration”54 a hypothesis, which is then tested against empirical data. The hypothesis is either 
confirmed or rejected, and the original theory may be revised accordingly.55 Deducing is ultimately 
about testing and applying an abstract concept (theory) to a concrete matter (empirical data). 
Deduction is therefore generally associated with the use of quantitative research methods.56 
Induction on the other hand takes its starting point in empirical data and usually ends with a (new) 
theory or hypothesis.57 Induction takes a concrete concept (empirical data) and formulates an abstract 
concept (theory).  When employing an inductive research approach, one does not always arrive at a 
“full” theory – often the result is some sort of “…empirical generalizations”58 which then can form 
the basis of a new research approach; abduction. Just like deduction, which is usually related to the 
use of quantitative methods, induction is “…typically associated with a qualitative research 
approach.”59  With that being said, the relationship between induction and qualitative methods is not 
“set in stone” and should therefore be considered as a guideline and not an actual upshot.60  
Abduction can be viewed as a mixture of the two above-mentioned research approaches. Abduction 
begins with induction which may generate a new theory or, as mentioned, some sort of empirical 
generalization. From the theory, or the empirical generalization, a hypothesis is deduced and applied 
to (new) empirical data. After the “deductive-stage” another induction is performed – and so it can 
theoretically continue. Abduction is ultimately about refining ones theory or hypothesis, and 
constantly perfecting the research it builds on.  
To answer our problem formulation and research questions, we have chosen an inductive research 
approach. We look at empirical material in order to answer our research questions and problem 
formulation. The explorative nature of our “how”- problem formulation and our research questions 
requires an inductive research approach. Our aim is, theoretically, to formulate a (new) theory, but 
we are aware of the fact that the outcome of our research will most likely result in empirical 
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generalizations. We seek to investigate global trends in the use of private military and security 
companies (hereafter referred to as PMSCs), and by applying social contract theory to our empirical 
findings; we discuss whether the use of PMSCs is affecting state’s authority.   
We seek a better understanding of the relationship between the use of PMSCs and the social contract. 
By exploring different possibilities in our research, we are able to theorize about the relationship in a 
broader context. 
Finally, induction is considered to be in line with our chosen ontological position, constructionism, 
and our chosen epistemology stance, social constructivism61. 
 
 
2.4 Analytical Strategy 
To follow the inductive research approach and answer the problem formulation, we have set up the 
following analytical strategy: 
 
Figure 1.1 Analytical Strategy 
Figure 1.1 illustrates how we will proceed throughout the project and how we will conceptualise the 
theoretical framework of the project. We will uncover, as introduced in the problem area, the global 
trend that is, that PMSCs are deeply entangled in national militaries. We will explore how PMSCs 
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are employed by three different states - chosen to exemplify how the history and culture of a state is 
instrumental in creating the social contract in relation to security. Contrary to Hobbes’ notion of the 
social contract in relation to security, we regard the social contract in relation to security as a social 
construction that is country and context specific.  
Because we are investigating the use of PMSC, it becomes apparent to examine their effects on states’ 
authority and the monopoly of violence. The services provided by PMSCs are closely linked to the 
use of force that, since the Peace of Westphalia, has been tied to the state. The military has generally 
been described as the sole provider of security as the state’s practical extension of the monopoly on 
violence and therefore we find it pertinent to investigate the use of PMSCs because they have become 
increasingly entangled in national militaries.   
When we have defined the concepts that we will employ throughout this project, the social contract 
in relation to security and PMSCs, we will move on to apply them to three different case studies 
where analysing how the use if PMSCs affect states’ authority and the provision of security. We have 
chosen Japan, the United States and Sierra Leone as case studies because they offer three very distinct 
perspectives on state authority and the provision of security.   
Finally to situate the research in a broader context, an investigation of how international actors, 
exemplified in international organisations, affect the social contract in general and states’ authority. 
2.5 Limitations 
In this project we only concern ourselves with what effect PMSCs have on states’ authority in regards 
to security provision as set out by the social contract. We do not investigate whether the use of PMSCs 
by states in today’s world affect other aspects of states’ authority. We have chosen to focus 
exclusively on state authority in regards to the provision of security because PMSCs operate within 
national militaries, and because PMSC services are closely linked to the use of force. We give a brief 
historic account of private military and security actors as utilised in warfare. However, we do not 
engage in an exploration of the debate about whether PMSCs are modern mercenaries, or whether 
PMSCs decrease democratic processes within a country.  
We are aware that other aspects of the deployment of PMSCs might affect states’ authority but we 
only focus on how it affects the provision of security, and, subsequently, if the use of PMSCs make 
states disregard their responsibility in regards to the social contract in relation to security between a 
state and civil society.  
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Additionally, we have not concerned ourselves with the debate over regulation and the legal aspects 
concerning the re-emergence and use of PMSCs. Moreover, we have not focused on the discussion 
of whether private military and security contractors distinguish themselves from national soldiers and 
how the morale of private military and security contractors may differ from national soldier due to 
the nature of PMSCs as profit driven corporations. Neither have we covered the debate within the 
academic literature that the deployment of PMSCs may in fact exacerbate conflicts and prolong them 
because PMSCs are profit driven and could therefore be interested in prolonging a conflict.  
Finally, it is important to point out a theoretical delimitation that we have taken in this project. Our 
theoretical point of departure is in a Hobbesian and realist notion of the social contract that focuses 
on the physical provision of security. However, we depart from Hobbes when anchoring the social 
contract in relation to security in a social constructivist framework. Our main argument is that the 
social contract in relation to security is not a static concept but instead a country-specific construction, 
and the provision of security is therefore ensured through, perhaps, dissimilar means in different 
states.  
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3. The Security Dimension of the Social Contract 
In this chapter, the different perspectives on the social contract will be outlined, and a working 
definition of the social contract as it will be used throughout this project will be established. As it has 
been explained in the previous chapters, the object of research in this project is how the use of PMSCs 
can affect a states authority, exemplified in the social contract. This chapter will therefore be an 
introduction of some of the classic as well as contemporary theorist within social contract theory, and 
from that utilise the conceptualisation of the social contract used in throughout this project. In the 
conceptualisation, it is argued that the social contract is an inherent social construction, and therefore 
country-specific, ultimately meaning that history and culture play an important role in constructing 
the social contract. 
 
3.1 Theories of the Social Contract 
3.1.1 Classical Views on the Social Contract 
The idea of the social contract can be traced back to the treaties of Cicero in “On the Republic”, in 
which he argues, “Not every multitude of men gathered together is a nation, but only such as have 
agreed to live by common lawful rule for the common advantage.”62 Even though this definition was 
generally accepted at the time, a definite definition of the social contract was not formulated 
throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.63 In the sixteenth century, the ideas about the social 
contract mainly revolved around whom the parties in the social contract were, what should the social 
contract be an agreement about, the conditions of the social contract, and how the social contract 
should be binding.64 
In 1651, Thomas Hobbes wrote the “Leviathan” – his contribution to the social contract theories. The 
book is generally thought of as the first accord of the social contract.65 One of Hobbes interests was 
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to show how it is possible for a cooperative civil society to exist when human beings are assumed to 
be antisocial by nature.66  
According to Hobbes, human beings enter into the social contract, in order to avoid the ´state of 
nature´, which is anarchic and life is “…solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”67 In the ´state of 
nature´, no law or shared moral ideals exist; it is everyman against everyman. Hobbes identifies three 
individual rights possessed by Man – the right to self-preservation, the right to do whatever is 
necessary for self-preservation and the right to decide what is necessary for securing self-
preservation.68 According to Hobbes, it is the exercise of these rights that creates conflict and war 
and it is Hobbes’s assumption that Man wants to move away from the ´state of nature´.69 Man must 
give up his three individual rights, and transfer it to a Sovereign coined by Hobbes as the Leviathan 
in order for him to leave the ´state of nature´.70 The individual potential for force is now invested in 
the Leviathan; the Leviathan has monopoly on the legitimate use of force.71 According to Hobbes, it 
is the sovereign’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force that is the condition for peace and 
security.72 Hobbes argues that the main goal for the Leviathan is to protect its citizens and create 
order. In fact, Hobbes believed that the possible lack of order without the Leviathan was a much 
bigger threat than the fear of a Leviathan “gone wild”.73  
Contrary to Hobbes, Rousseau emphasised that the right to self-preservation must never be transferred 
to a sovereign74, and that the “…control over the state and armed forces has to rest with the 
citizens.”75 Rousseau sought to identify the means through which citizens could prevent the abuse of 
military and political power by the government, because he believed that the collective force of the 
sovereign could be used against its citizens or their interests.76 Unlike Hobbes understanding of the 
social contract, Rousseau emphasised that the relationship between the citizens is what constitutes 
the social contract: “Social Contract is a contract among all citizens rather than between the citizens 
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and a sovereign.”77 Likewise, Locke believed that Man give up his natural rights “…not to a 
sovereign but ´into the hands of the community.´”78  Similar is the view of Kant and Rousseau who 
argued, “Popular sovereignty rather signified the transformation of authoritarian into self-legislated 
power.”79  
 
3.1.2 Contemporary View on the Social Contract 
When investigating the social contract within African countries, Nugent (2010) finds that the central 
question regarding the social contract is why states, “…have proved to be such weak Leviathans,”80 
and argues that the answer is often found in the historical and structural situation of the specific 
state.81 Nugent (2010) does, however, outline three different types of social contracts he believes to 
be present in Africa, from colonial time to the present: the coercive, the productive and the 
permissive.82 
The coercive contract represents a social contract the population is threatened into entering, and the 
citizens often relinquish fundamental human rights in order to stop violent acts from being 
perpetrated.83 Within the productive contract84, the ruler and the ruled both can see the benefits of the 
contract. The citizens recognises the benefits of the government providing security, thereby creating 
a social contract that is mutually agreed upon. The permissive contract85 falls somewhere in the 
middle. The ruling power claim the complete authority over a given territory, but chooses not to 
exercise it, which leads to semi-autonomous regions within a state. However, this form of social 
contract ensures some sort manageability and peace.  
Nugent (2010) recognises the role of external actors, who “… played their own part in inscribing the 
contract.”86 Nugent (2010) uses example such as the Nordic countries in Tanzania, and the 
relationship between France and its former colonies. He thereby makes room in his interpretation of 
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the social contract, contrary to e.g. Hobbes, for that influence can from other places than the state. 
However, at the same time recognising that social contract always has to be seen from the specific 
national point of view.  
 
3.2 Our Conceptualisation of the Social Contract 
As argued by Habermas (1992/2007), the “…national public spheres are culturally isolated from one 
another. They are anchored in contexts in which political issues only gain relevance against the 
background of national histories and national experiences”87. It is therefore not possible to argue for 
one objective notion of the social contract, which can be said to be applicable to all states; rather it is 
contract that should be understood in relation to a specific countries history and culture. 
Hobbes’ understanding of the social contract is narrowly defined as the physical security of the state. 
In this view, the military becomes the practical extension the state’s authority in that the military is 
the practical provider of security. However, moving away from the narrow definition of the social 
contract as presented by Hobbes, the main argument that we will be pursuing in this project is that 
the construction of the social contract is country-specific, and that the use of PMSCs therefore affects 
the social contract in different ways in different countries. We will try to portray how it does not make 
sense to talk of a predetermined and definitive construction of a state’s social contract when using 
PMSCs. This view is supported by Nugent (2010) in his classification of the different kinds of social 
contracts in Africa. 
Consequently, our conceptualisation of the social contract is departing from Hobbes and his notion 
of states’ adherence to the social contract in relation to security. In this sense, if a state is to uphold 
the social contract, it must secure its citizens. However, as conceptualised in this project, as long as 
states provide security for the citizens, the means of security is irrelevant. How states decide to protect 
its citizens is therefore its prerogative, making the social contract constructed within a given state so 
that it becomes context-based. As long as security is provided, states adhere to the social contract in 
relation to security. Thereby, in order to investigate how and if the use of PMSCs affect states’ 
authority, it is crucial to identify a state’s social contract. 
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4. Private Military and Security Actors in Warfare  
4.1 Historical Perspective on the Use of Private Military and Security 
Entities 
The realm of warfare has traditionally been seen as “…engaged in by public militaries, fighting for 
the common cause.”88 Not only in the aspect of who can declare war on whom, but also who does the 
actual fighting in a conflict and for what reason. In this chapter, we will argue with an historical 
perspective, that private military and security actors have always been a constituent of states’ military 
capacities, and that the re-emergence of Private Military Security Companies (hereafter referred to as 
PMSCs) is not an unprecedented phenomenon. In addition, we will highlight the structural changes 
after the Cold War as a one of the foundations for the re-emergence of private actors in contemporary 
warfare.  
When exploring the history of state formation, it is evident that the state has not had the sole monopoly 
on violence throughout history.89 Instead, states, or rulers, relied on individuals, companies, and 
mercenaries to provide military services. The private actors were instrumental in building states, 
empires and society. PMSCs are, therefore, not an invention of the 21st century, but, instead, part of 
state formation.  P.W. Singer proposes three different reasons for the use of private military entities 
throughout history: first, the effectiveness of private companies in areas of weak governance.90  This 
could be in Africa, where a large group of states have trouble defending their own borders, or when 
a larger state collapses due to ethnic, religious or cultural conflict, as seen in the former Yugoslavia 
or Sierra Leone. The second reason is the inverse relationship of military demobilization in one area, 
leads to a rise in conflict in another area - particularly in areas with weak states. 91 There are many 
examples of this; veterans from the Napoleonic Wars were a driving force in the separatist movements 
in Latin America. Finally, the relationship between the different types of warfare and the need for 
hired troops.92 For example, in the Middle Ages, as military individual skills were important on the 
battlefield, there was a high demand in skilled private companies due to fact that they specialised 
skills. 
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The end of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) marked a starting point for a significant shift in the 
way military units and of warfare were organised. The incredible technological advances in this time-
period meant that the actual fighting skills of a soldier became less important. The introduction of 
black powder and muskets, no particular skills were required in order to press a trigger; leading to the 
declining demand of private military actors. 93 
With the signing of the peace treaty in Westphalia in 1648, the result was that the “…concept of 
sovereignty won out against that of empire”94 and therefore solidified the birth of the state around 
this very concept of sovereignty. The subsequent years saw the emergence of nationalized armies. 
From 1650 to 1750, the century saw continuous efforts towards the construction of a state-loyal and 
professional army: creation of military schools, introduction of the uniform, separation of military 
and civilians, suppression of the commercial character of the military units.95 From then on the 
“…protecting civilians, even enemy civilians, and their property became a prominent feature of the 
practice of war of regular and regularly paid professional armies”.96 This was one of the key factor 
of the birth of the modern state. Hired units did not disappear, but their market was gradually being 
taken over by the citizens’ army. With the rise of the concept of the state, many smaller states began 
to invoke their right to sovereignty within their borders. However, due to the normative shift 
implemented by the Westphalia Peace Treaty and the French revolution, a state had to be able to 
protect its own borders without help from foreign units, in order for its rights to be recognized. 97 By 
the end of the 18th century, the role of private military actors on the battlefield changed, but they did 
not completely disappear. By the 20th century, the main form of private military and security was the 
individual, former soldier. 98 Their primary employers were rebel groups or companies operating in 
areas that lacked government control in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The decolonization period 
of the 1950s and 1960s, especially in Africa, became their golden era, where the former colonial-
powers wanted to retain some of their influence on the new states.99  
 
                                                             
93 Singer, P.W. (2008), p.29 
94 Singer, P.W. (2008), p.29 
95 Mandrup, T. (2012), p.26 
96 Mandrup, T. (2012), p.26 
97 Singer, P.W. (2008), p.31 
98 Singer, P.W. (2008), p.37 
99 Singer, P.W. (2008), p.37 
26 
 
4.1.1 Structural Changes after the Cold War 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the neo-liberal discourse had been prevalent in a more and more 
interconnected, globalized world. The world have seen outscoring of public-owned institutions 
“…and areas formerly associated to the (welfare) state” to the private sector. As a logical step in the 
effort to achieve effectiveness and general downsizing of the public sector, the public security sector 
has also been affected by out-sourcing.100 The United States are a good example of this trend. The 
country raised the total of private military expenditure by 146% between 1996 and 2006, while at the 
same time reducing noticeably the governmental budget directed to the national army.101 However, 
the trend of out-sourcing security is not only confined to the United States, but it has instead 
…increased globally”.102 PMSCs became the receiver of the previous public security, and within few 
years, revenues in the private military and security sector increased dramatically. PMSCs revenues 
was worth 100 billion US$ globally in 2006, in comparison the net operating revenue of Coca Cola 
in 2010 was $35.119 billion103, and the revenues is only predicated to increase drastically in the years 
to come.104 
Along with the privatization of public security, the structural changes after the Cold War was 
determination in the re-emergence of private actors in security. According to Dr Johanna Spear, the 
cut in military spending by many states after the Cold War, impacted the private military and security 
sector in two different ways 1) after a conflict the inadequate DDR (disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration) of soldiers may course instability in post-warzones and subsequently require 
PMSCs as a stabilizing factor. 2) Many demobilized soldiers in post-warzones are unable to 
reintegrate, due a scattered economy incapable of providing career opportunities. Instead, they offer 
their military skills to PMSCs.105 This was, for example, visible in the South African post-apartheid 
era where most of the personal employed by PMSCs were former veterans. Both local and global 
changes thus influenced the increase in supply to the private military and security sector. The ending 
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of local conflicts, like Apartheid regime in South Africa, and the global military downsizing after the 
Cold War “…led to a flood of experienced personnel available for contracting.”106 
The end of the Cold War did not only affect the supply in military personnel to the private military 
and security sector. The re-emergence of private military and security actors was also highly 
influenced by the increasing demand for military skills after the Cold War. The demand came from 
several sides107. From states that previously relied on Clod War-patrons now turned to PMSCs for 
help to secure internal security and stability. Furthermore, states that adapted the privatization 
discourse and downsized their public military sought to streamline and make their remaining military 
effective by the help of military experts in PMSCs, and from non-state actors operating in areas 
previously held stable and secure by Cold War-patrons.108 
The changed nature of warfare, referred to as “New Wars” by Mary Kaldor, has also affected the re-
emergence of private military and security actors in warfare. In “New Wars”, the monopoly on 
legitimate violence no longer resides with states – instead, factors such as privatization has eroded 
states monopoly on violence, creating space for PMSCs. 109 
Berndtsson refers to the 21st century conflicts as “Low Intensity Conflicts”. Their main characteristics 
are that they are mostly affecting developing part of the world within weak or failing states and not 
necessarily involving regular armies on both side but mostly a myriad of different actors. In addition, 
they do not rely on high-technology weaponry.110 Those characteristics are a perfect environment for 
PMSCs to develop because of their high skilled personal that can easily set back insurgencies troops 
or provide additional logistic support in order of weak governments to stabilize their power. The 
example of Sierra Leonean civil war starting in 1991 is a perfect example of new war that has shown 
the whole efficiency of PMSCs as counterinsurgency forces. 
 
4.1.2 Conclusion and Conceptualisation  
In summary, since the beginning of the 1990s, PMSCs have been part of many armed conflicts. The 
United States, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Colombia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq are the most 
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common cases where we can find noticeable deployment of PMSCs.  The growing market for private 
military security actors can be seen as the outcomes of “…structural changes following the end of the 
Cold War and the acceleration of globalisation”.111 The prevalent privatization discourse, along with 
an increase in supply and demand after the Cold War, helped the re-emergence of private military 
and security actors. Furthermore, the changed nature of warfare was the ideal setting for the expansion 
of PMSCs. It is important be bear in mind that, as argued above, no state has had the full monopoly 
on legitimate violence.  
The re-emergence of private military and security actors in warfare, has cast along numerous 
questions concerning legitimacy and control. Questions include the behaviour of employees of private 
military and security contractors towards enemies and civilians. Furthermore, concerns have been 
raised regarding the issue of control because ultimately PMSCs challenge the fundamental notion of 
a state’s monopoly of legitimate violence.112  
Therefore, a definition of PMSCs is required to understand the different objections towards them, as 
well as their potential for assisting states. In the Montreux Document (2009), PMSCs are defined as: 
“…private business entities that provide military and/or security services, 
irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services 
include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such 
as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons 
systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security 
personnel.”113 
The Montreux Document is a product of an international process kicked off by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Government. The document aims at promoting respect 
for international humanitarian law and human rights law whenever PMSCs are involved in armed 
conflicts. Seventeen participating governments who, insofar, has had the most experiences in dealing 
with PMSCs drew up the provisions stated in the document.  
Contrary to the Montreux Document, P.W. Singer insists on distinguishing between private military 
firms (hereafter referred to as PMFs) and private security companies (hereafter referred to as PSCs). 
                                                             
111 Berndtsson, J. (2009), p.135 
112 Lind, G. (2012). Private Security Providers, past and Future. Danish Defence, p. 14. 
113 The Montreux Document (2009). The Montreux Document – On pertinent international legal obligations and 
good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict. 
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Government of Switzerland, p. 9.   
29 
 
This is done to identify the different tasks performed by PMFs and PSCs. According to Singer, private 
military firms are “business providers of professional services intricately linked to warfare.”114 In 
line with Singer’s categorization, a private security company “…is a registered civilian company that 
specializes in providing contract commercial services to domestic and foreign entities with the intent 
to protect personnel and humanitarian and industrial assets within the rule of applicable domestic 
law.”115  
Singer’s sharp distinction between may have to do with the issue of classifying private military and 
security employees as either combatants or civilians under international law and international 
humanitarian law. The status of a PMF or PSC employee depends largely on the context and on which 
service the employee provides. 
 
It becomes somewhat apparent when turning to the existing academic literature that the differences 
between PMSCs are rather blurred. Therefore, it is important to establish a working definition of 
PMSCs as used throughout this project. Our definition of PMSCs takes its point of departure in 
Singer’s definition of both PMFs and PSCs, and we do therefore not distinguish between companies 
that only provide military or security services, but instead we include both forms of services.  When 
researching states’ authority expressed by the provision of security, it does not make sense to divide 
private entities into military and security companies.  
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5. The United States 
 
5.1 Introduction 
We have chosen the United States as a case study because of its unique status internationally as a 
political, economic and military superpower.116 Moreover, the United States is deemed a relevant 
case study, due to its military’s heavy reliance on private military and security contractors: “The size 
of the contemporary private military industry is staggering. In particular, [...] the United States 
(USA) has outsourced large sections of their national and international security provision to the 
private sector.”117 In 2007, the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to as DoD) in an internal 
survey found that the private military and security industry in Iraq was comprised of 180.000 
contractors compared to 160.000 US troops at the time.118 Although one cannot claim that the 
privatization of war and security is a new phenomenon, the degree to which private military and 
security companies (hereafter referred to as PMSCs) have become integral parts of national militaries 
is staggering especially when one turns the attention to the United States.  
The main argument that we pursue in this project is that the configuration of the social contract in 
relation to security, is country-specific and that the use of PMSCs therefore affects the social contract, 
and thus states’ authority, differently depending on the country in question. We try to portray how it 
does not make sense to talk of a predetermined and definitive reconfiguration of states’ social contract 
when using PMSCs. The historical context of a state, and thus its social contract, differs from state to 
state, and it therefore becomes logical to conclude that PMSCs affect states’ authority differently.    
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The main points that we make in regards to the case study of the United States is, that the basis upon 
which the social contract in relation to security is built, has been subject to change. The security 
dimension of the social contract is transformed because the military has evolved from being the sole 
provider to being a manager of national security.  The changed role of the armed forces is due to the 
implementation of neo-liberalist policies up through the 1980s and 1990s, which has amplified the 
outsourcing of military functions so that they are no longer considered core functions of the American 
state.119 We argue that although the United States military has outsourced a wide range of functions 
to PMSCs previously considered inherently governmental, the American state continues to abide the 
social contract in relation to security.  
 
We commence by giving a brief introduction to the history of the United States, where we will reach 
a working definition of the American social contract in relation to security and how it has been 
constructed. The historical context will help frame the question of how PMSCs affect the security 
dimension of the social contract in the United States. Subsequently, we will outline the nature of the 
American military, which, by and large, has been shaped by the same historical trends that have also 
formed the social contract. We touch upon the importance of neoliberalism and what impact it has 
had on the American military. It becomes relevant to assess how the neoliberal principle of “[…] 
democratic control and accountability of the state and the military are best protected by delimiting 
their functions and resources”120, has led to a redefinition of those functions considered inherently 
governmental “[…] and, thus, affect the state monopoly on collective violence”121 and in which ways 
this has had an impact on the relationship between the United States military, the American state and 
its citizens.122 We put the nature of the American armed forces and their reliance on PMSCs into 
perspective by drawing on a survey highlighting the American publics’ confidence in their armed 
forces. Understanding the nature of the American military allows us to complete the working 
definition of the social contract in relation to security, because it is the military as the practical 
extension of the American state’s monopoly on violence that guarantees civil society’s security. 
Finally, we conclude by commenting on whether the United States’ use of PMSCs has had a lasting 
effect on the social contract and the American state’s authority.       
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5.2 Social Contract Formation in the United States  
5.2.1 The American Independence  
After having been a European colony since the late fifteenth-century123, the American claim for 
independence was built on English political writers such as John Locke who “[…] argued that all 
persons posses a natural right to life, liberty, and property, that government exits to protect these 
rights; and that the consent of the governed represents the sole basis of political legitimacy”.124 In 
1776, a declaration draft, with Thomas Jefferson as the principal author, proclaimed: “[…] these 
United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, free and Independent States”125. On July 4th 1776, the 
Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence.  
During the early congressional debates, which were recorded by Virginia’s James Madison before 
winning the War of Independence, delegates expressed their knowledge of political theory. Most 
liberal delegates referred to John Locke and his natural-rights theory “[…] upholding popular consent 
as the source of governmental legitimacy”126, whilst conservative delegates grounded their arguments 
in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan stressing “[…] the need for a strong government to prevent social 
chaos and civil war”.127 However, both factions had a shared fear for tyranny, and, consequently, the 
power of the federal government was divided into three branches.128 The American Constitution, 
beginning with “We the people of the United States”129, established a republic in which the governing 
body was accountable to the people through elections.130 With the signing of the Constitution in 1788, 
and the Bill of Rights in 1791, “[…] thirteen British colonies had won their independence and 
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established a new nation. The 1787 Constitution […] stands as a remarkable achievement, creating 
the first modern republican government.”131  
The United States was formally built on the theoretical thoughts of, among others, Locke and Hobbes. 
Hobbes’ theory of the social contract, as outlined in the “Leviathan”, can be clearly linked to the very 
beginning of The United States Constitution. As stated by Hobbes, in order to avoid the state of 
nature, and thereby an anarchic life that is “[…] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”132, the 
populace of the new nation had to give up their collective rights to self-preservation, and transfer it 
to a sovereign, in this case the Congress of the United States. The main objective of the sovereign is 
to protect its citizens and create order, a virtue also set forth in the United States Constitution 
expressed clearly by the following statement “[…] insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and 
our Posterity.”133 Although the citizens of the new republic vested their right to self-preservation, as 
described by Hobbes, in a sovereign it is, however, pertinent to bear the subsequent amendments to 
the Constitution in mind , especially the 2nd Amendment that reads: “[…] the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”134 “We the people”135 therefore retained a right to 
provide their own security if their sovereign was unable to do so.  
What we are able to discern from the above mentioned passages of the United States Constitution, is 
that the Constitution was instrumental in formalizing the relationship between the people of America 
and the government thus establishing the social contract of the United States.  
 
5.2.2 The United States and the Outsourcing of Military Functions 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ armed forces have greatly expanded their use of 
PMSCs. In the 1980s, President Reagan was set on promoting the outsourcing of military functions 
to the private military and security industries, thus enabling him to edge closer to his neoliberal 
conception of the ‘small state.’136 However, simultaneous increases in defence expenditures derailed 
his efforts. Nonetheless, Reagan’s successors, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 
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picked up where Reagan had left off, and continued to promote neoliberal policies in regards to the 
armed forces.137 The United States public was receptive of these neoliberal policies introduced, 
especially, by the Clinton administration, and the cuts in the military budget were welcomed138. 
However, some years after the end of the Cold War, the United States government had to reassess its 
security analysis due to the rise of new security threats emanating from ethnic strife on the Balkans, 
the genocide in Rwanda, and international terrorism.139 The changed nature of the international 
security environment, and a newfound emphasis on interventionist security policy, did not lead to 
significant reversals of the post-Cold War cuts in defence spending or of military personnel.140 
Instead, the financial strain of several military contingencies overseas amplified the pace of neoliberal 
reform and the outsourcing of a widening range of military functions to private military and security 
industries.141  
5.2.3 Neoliberalism and the Armed Forces 
In 1955, the Eisenhower administration proclaimed that; “It is the general policy of the Federal 
Government that it will not start or carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or product 
for its use if such product or service can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary 
business channels.”142 It becomes evident in this statement, that a conviction regarding the benefits 
of outsourcing military functions existed, within the Eisenhower administration.143 In 1966, the Office 
of Management and Budget (OBM) introduced the Circular A-76 procedure, enabling governmental 
departments and institutions to compare the private and public sector provisions of goods and 
services. Although the Circular A-76 was not used substantially at the time of its introduction, it, 
nonetheless, laid the foundations for the outsourcing of military and security services in the United 
States.  
Circular A-76 involves five stages144 
1) The armed forces recognises a function which possibly could be outsourced, 
2) The armed forced notifies the Congress of the evaluation, 
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3) The military base which previously was responsible for the function, outline the type of work, 
the work hours and the skill required 
4) The armed forces invites bids from the private sector, and at the same time the military 
develops a competing bid, called Most Efficient Organization (MEO) 
5) The private and military bids are compared.  
In order for a private bid to be successful, it has to be “[…] either 10 per cent of the personnel cost 
or $10 million lower than the MEO”145. Although utilised by many government agencies, the United 
States military remains the single largest user of the Circular A-76 procedure. Following the 
amplification of neoliberalism during the 1980s, the number of A-76 procedures nearly doubled 
within the DoD.146 During the Clinton administration, Vice-President Al Gore championed neoliberal 
policies and proclaimed that the aim of the administration was “[…] reforming and reinventing 
government so that it is smaller, smarter and more responsive.”147 In order to investigate how this 
goal was to be reached for the armed forces, the administration appointed the Commission on the 
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (hereafter referred to as CRMAF), which two years later 
came out with a report that stated that an increase in competition and greater efficiency would result 
in an improvement of the provision of national security.148  
According to the CRMAF, the first step towards reducing the cost of defence was the elimination of 
legislation in the United States Code title 10-Armed Forces, that was restrictive and effectively 
prohibited the outsourcing of core military functions.149 Following this report, and subsequent ones, 
there was a clear conviction that competition between the public and private sector would lead to cuts 
in spending: “[…] the prime motive for the privatisation and outsourcing of military functions was 
projected savings of about 20 per cent”150, but by 2001, it had become clear that this was not the case. 
However, the Bush-administration “[…] remained firmly committed to the Neoliberal ideal of 
increasing the role of private firms in the provision of military services.”151 By 1996, the DoD had 
bought 25 % of base commercial activities, 28 % of depot maintenance, 10 % of finance and 
accounting, 70 % of army aviation training, 45 % of surplus property disposal, and 33 % of parts 
distributions from the private military and security industries. In the following decade, the total 
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expenditures on PMSCs increased by 146 % from $46 to $113 billion.152 The biggest increases 
occurred in Administration and Management (227 %), Transport and Travel (190 %), Training and 
Education (178 %), Data Processing and Communications (173 %), Utilities and Housekeeping (154 
%) and Maintenance and Repair (122 %), and as such the biggest increases occurred within areas that 
were previously considered inherently governmental functions until the mid-1990s.153   
These developments have led the United Sates to become internationally known for the scale to which 
“[…] it has outsourced national and international security services to private military 
contractors.”154 In order for us to assess how the privatisation of military and security functions has 
affected the social contract in relation to security, we will in the following section point out what 
aspects of the United States military that has been portrayed as core functions of the military, and 
thus core characteristics of the American state.   
 
5.3 The Core Functions of the US and its Armed Forces 
The United States has become internationally known for its reliance on PMSCs in the provision of 
national security.155 In 2008 alone, the United States defence budget amounted to $650 billion, of 
which the armed forces spent $315 billion on military equipment and services provided by PMSCs.156 
The main shift within the United States is that the military has evolved from being the “provider” to 
being the “manager” of national security.157  
Before the 1990s, the definition of the core elements of the American government was fairly broad.158 
The CRMAF categorised all military tasks for inherently governmental if they “[…] represent the 
exercise of sovereign power”159, and since the military is the practical extension of the American 
state’s monopoly on violence, their activities were deemed inherently governmental. The CRMAF 
found that only areas such as “[…] depot maintenance, medical care and family housing”160 should 
be outsourced. In areas such as military logistics and aviation support the CRMAF recommend that 
                                                             
152 Krahmann, E. (2010) p.129-130  
153 Krahmann, E. (2010) p.129-130 
154 Krahmann, E. (2010) p.125 
155 Avant, D. D. & Nevers, R. de (2011) Military Contractors & the American Way of War, in: the American Academy 
of Arts & Science, p. 1. 
156 Krahmann, E. (2010) p.125 
157 Krahmann, E. (2010) p.126 
158 Krahmann, E. (2010) p.126 
159 Krahmann, E. (2010) p.126 
160 Krahmann, E. (2010) p.126. 
37 
 
reforms were to stay in-house instead of being outsourced. 161 Finally, the Commission emphasized 
that an extensive use of PMSCs would entail a shift in the role of the military from that of a provider 
to a manager. However, in order to live up to a managerial role, significant investments and retraining 
of DoD staff was required.  
Avant & de Nevers (2011) add that even as DoD contract transactions with PMSCs soared by 328 % 
between 2000 and 2009, the staff reviewing these contracts declined from 70 in 2002 to 14 in 2009 
at the Defence Contract Management Agency.162 The necessity of retraining and investments enabling 
the military to live up to its new managerial role was thus disregarded.  
Another report from the DoD in 1996 cautioned of the potential over extensive use of PMSCs. The 
report stated that the armed forces should only contemplate military outsourcing if it 1) did not affect 
core military capabilities, 2) if there was a competitive market for these activities, and 3) if 
outsourcing would improve or lower the cost of a services in the long-run163. These conditions were 
reiterated repeatedly, and in 1997, the Annual Defence Report maintained that: “Many activities can 
be best performed by the government entities currently doing the job – because of expertise or 
technological edge [...] in these cases, the Department will retain these capabilities”164. Furthermore, 
it was argued that many technical tasks could not be outsourced because of considerations of ‘national 
security.’165    
Nevertheless, the Clinton administration interpreted the Commission’s findings differently than the 
military.166 The Secretary of Defence, William J. Perry, and his successor, William S. Cohen, 
promised to work towards increased outsourcing of military functions to the private sector.167  As 
Krahman (2010) puts it: “The neoliberal redefinition of the core functions of the state and the soldier 
by the Clinton and Bush administration has transformed the contributions of private contractors to 
US national security.”168  
The Clinton and Bush administrations influenced the military into conferring with the Circular A-76 
procedure to a greater extent leading to a progressive expansion “[…] of the number and types of 
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functions delegated to commercial suppliers”169. Initially, the United States government only 
outsourced “[…] primarily civilian functions, such as catering and cleaning, or highly specialised 
technical services”170, but the pressure on the military led to a new definition of what was commercial, 
and thereby relevant to outsource, and which tasks were inherently governmental. Today, the 
commercial tasks cover “[…] the whole spectrum of the civilian and military tasks of the armed 
forces, with the exception of large-scale armed combat.”171  
To sum up, the reliance on PMSCs in the United States means that the United States military no 
longer holds the role as the sole provider of national security, hence leading to the conclusion that the 
base upon which the social contract in relation to security was built, has changed. The military is now 
the manager of national security due to the outsourcing of military functions that previously were 
defined as inherently governmental. This does not necessarily mean that there has been a loss of 
authority or that the American government does not adhere to the social contract. PMSCs exemplify 
how there has been an increase in neoliberal policies in the United States since the 1980s, which have 
led to a change in the practise of the United States government when providing security. It is important 
to stress that the United States government still adheres to the social contract in relation to security, 
even though the military is now managing rather than providing national security.   
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5.4 American’s Attitudes towards the Military 
A recently published Gallup poll found that Americans continue to express profound confidence in 
the United States military. In fact, Americans place more trust in the military than in any of the other 
15 national institutions represented in the survey, see figure 2. Since 1973, Gallup has asked 
Americans how much confidence they place in a variety of U.S. institutions. 43 % of Americans 
declare that they have a ‘great deal’ of confidence in the military, and 33 % declare that they have 
quite a lot of confidence in the military172. Only 6 % of respondents expressed that they had very little 
confidence in the military. Americans’ confidence in the military has not changed significantly since 
the first Gallup survey was conducted in 1973. In fact, the military has been ranked as the top 
institution each year since 1998, and from 1989 to 1996.173 In 1997 when small businesses were added 
to the survey for the first time, it beat out the military by 63 % to 60 %.174  
This poll gives the impression that the American people have great confidence in the American 
military. We cannot argue from this poll that the outsourcing of what has traditionally been perceived 
as core military functions have or have not affected the American population’s attitudes towards the 
military. However, in line with our conceptualisation of the social contract in relation to security, the 
poll suggests that the population still regards the military, and thereby the American state, as the 
institution ensuring the provision of security. The Gallup poll therefore suggests that to the American 
public it does not matter whether the military is a provider of national security or merely a manager, 
as long as the military guarantees the safety of the American public.  
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5.6 The Social Contract, PMSCs and the Monopoly on Violence 
Since the 1980s, there has been a shift in the theoretical approach to the social contract in relation to 
security in the United States - from republicanism to liberalism.175 President Ronald Regan started 
promoting “the small state”, and with it the professionalization of the military. President Regan’s 
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three successors Georg H.W. Bush (1989-93), Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and Georg W. Bush (2001-
2009) stayed on track, promoted many neoliberal policies on the military during their presidencies.176 
The primary objective of the Clinton administration was to change the military from a supplier to a 
manager of military services. This distinction is incredibly important in regards to the object of this 
project, because it highlights how the military traditionally has been in charge, as the practical 
extension of the American state’s monopoly on violence, of supplying and providing national 
security. By outsourcing core functions of the military to PMSCs, and becoming a manager of military 
services instead of a provider, the base upon which the social contract in relation to security is built, 
is altered. The American state’s provision of security is no longer exclusively confined to the military, 
but, instead, is being outsourced to PMSCs.  
The neoliberal policies that swept through the military and DoD during the Clinton and Bush 
administrations, resulted in reductions in civilian and military personnel, especially in the DoD, and 
resulted in the military focusing exclusively on its core functions as well as on an increasing number 
of PMSCs. However, by 2008, only 25.000 contract management personnel were overseeing 
contracts amounting to $315 billion.177   
As we have shown in the previous sections, the base upon which the social contract in relation to 
security in the United States is built has been altered. Although the United States uses PMSCs 
extensively, this has not translated directly into a diminishing confidence in the United States military 
as an institution, as seen in the Gallup Poll previously mentioned. This may very well correlate with 
the fact that the use of PMSCs generally is not subject to intense public scrutiny, and therefore it is 
easier to mobilize and employ PMSCs than regular troops.178 Unlike, the professional soldier whose 
services are dictated by the social contract in relation to security, the private contractor’s services are 
based upon a commercial contract that he/she has entered into.179 Therefore, the private contractor is 
not an integral part of the social contractarian bond, which revolves around the provision of security, 
between the American state and civil society.180 Andreas Krieg argues that, as such, the private 
contractor does not enjoy the same level of respect nor concern from civil society.181  
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Also, staff overlooking contractor support contracts declined from 70 to 14 within a decade. Loss of 
control may therefore entail that the provision of security originally placed in the military is 
endangered due to the fact that PMSCs are not subject to any regulation, or due to their civilian status 
they are not under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).182 The PMSCs are thereby not held 
accountable to the public.  
If we turn our attention towards probable objections to our analysis, critics could potentially point 
out, as Singer (2008) does, that by relying heavily on contractor support, the United States military 
risks being “held hostage”183 by an agent (PMSC), and if the agent does not honour a contract, it 
could potentially disrupt military operations.184 Basically, when a principal, that is the United States 
military in this case, loses its in house-capabilities, it is then at the mercy of the agent’s compliance. 
The Canadian military experienced this when financial disagreements between a contractor and a 
subcontractor, led to 1/3 of Canada’s military equipment and military personnel being held hostage 
at sea for two weeks in 2000.185  
By outsourcing military core functions, the United States military risks losing control.186 We have 
described how the United States military has evolved from being a provider of security to being a 
manager, and thus the base upon which social contract in relation to security is built, has shifted 
because it is no longer the military who is the sole provider of security. The use of PMSCs may 
effectively “Undermine democratic accountability by circumventing parliamentary constraints on 
the use of force and reducing control on the battlefield.”187 By potentially undermining the 
parliamentary constraints on the use of force PMSCs, could result in a breach of the social contract 
in relation to security as established in the United States Constitution. The use of PMSCs can therefore 
be thought to break with this original social contract in relation to security because limited oversight 
procedures and regulations allow PMSCs to operate sometimes without consequences. Pattison 
argues that the “The state’s right to rule over us, and our obligation to obey its rule, depend on the 
provision of national defense and the maintenance of internal security (see Constitution under 
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“tranquility”). By hiring PMCs to provide national defense, however, the state may be claimed to 
renege on its side of the bargain.”188 
However, as we argue, as long as the national security is provided, the American state cannot be said 
to disregard its responsibility to the people. It does not matter who provides the security - whether it 
is the military or PMSCs. The issue remains though that the military has a direct responsibility to the 
state, the PMSCs do not. Therefore, if these PMSCs do not honour their contracts they may disrupt 
the operations of the United States military, as well as call into question the stability of the social 
contract in relation to security between the American state and the American public.  
However as Pattison argues, which is in line with our main argument: “[…] a state does not need to 
be the sole provider of military force for it to be justified on the terms of the social contract. What 
matters instead is that it effectively protects its citizens from internal and external threats”189. One 
could therefore argue that the United States military’s reliance on PMSCs is not problematic because 
it thus becomes better able to adapt to today’s global threats and the international security 
environment, which requires something different and other competencies from the military than 
previously.    
 
5.7 Current day use of PMSCs: Iraq 
On the eve of 19 March 2003, armed forces of the United States touched down on Iraqi soil.190 
Although the motivations and miscalculations of the Iraqi war continues to be a hotly debated topic, 
consensus is starting to build on the fact that insufficient US forces were sent for the mission.191 To 
rectify the issue, several options were at hand, but politically unfeasible. One answer to the issue 
would simply have been for the United States administration to commit more troops. However, this 
would have implied that the top brass within the military and DoD had been incompetent in their 
planning and execution of the operation.192 Furthermore, the American public was not willingly going 
to send off more brothers, sisters and fathers to the 135.000 troops already deployed which had been 
estimated as sufficient manpower to accomplish the mission.193 The private military and security 
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industries turned out to be the answer to this dilemma. PMSCs would be able to support the US troops 
and, far more importantly, would not warrant any political costs – they were regarded as a “positive 
externality”.194 In stark contrast to the deployment of US troops, there was no public outcry when 
PMSCs were contracted and deployed to Iraq. Additionally, as the death toll among Americans 
continued to rise and wore down on Bush’s approval ratings, contractor casualties were not accounted 
for in the official death tolls and thus had no bearing on Bush’s standing.195 Molly Dunigan 
emphasizes how the Iraq War may be remembered as “America's most privatized military 
engagement to date”196, where at certain points during the contingency PMSCs outnumbered troops 
on the ground. Despite the unprecedented reliance on PMSCs in Iraq, the United States public 
remained oblivious to the sheer numbers of PMSCs because the death of American soldiers generally 
dominated the news – the Iraq War cost 4.480 American soldiers their lives and 3.400 private military 
and security contractors theirs.197 In 2008, the DoD employed 155.826 private military and security 
contractors in Iraq compared to 152.275 troops.198 The reliance on PMSCs in Iraq may have been a 
viable policy option because contractors had the potential to enhance the United States military 
capacity.199 As we have argued in the previous sections, the United States military has developed an 
increasing dependence on PMSCs especially concerning functions that were previously considered 
core functions of the state. The United States military as the practical extension of the American 
state’s monopoly on violence, was thus in charge of ensuring national security and was the only 
institution allowed to wield the use of force.  
Between 1992 and 1997, the United States military has spent roughly $815 million to employ PMSCs 
under its Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.200 That equals spending $163 million per year, or 
about $200 million per year in 2012 dollars on PMSC contracts. However, between 2001 and 2010, 
that expenditure grew to almost $5 billion per year.201 One has to bear in mind however that these 
increases correlates with the United States involvement in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq. Throughout 
the war in Iraq, the majority (61 %) of activities contracted by PMSCs were base-support functions.202 
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The second-largest group (18 %) of DoD PMSCs were security contractors. These PMSCs provided 
security services, such as guarding installations, protecting convoys, or acting as bodyguards. These 
services have previously been classified as inherently governmental military functions. 203 Moreover, 
the privatization of war continued in Afghanistan, where 94.413 contractors were present in 2010, 
compared to 91.600 US troops.204  
Both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were fought to preserve American interests and secure the 
American homeland. 205 As such, we can argue that the United States government abided their social 
contract in relation to security and their responsibility towards the American people of providing their 
security. However, due to the changed nature from being a provider of security to being a manager 
and the lacking oversight with the PMSCs that it employs the United States may also be said to 
disregard their part of the social contract because they are not probably managing their contracts with 
the PMSCs.   
 
5.8 Conclusion 
We have examined how the United States has and continues to outsource military functions to 
PMSCs. The United States remains the single largest contractor of private military companies in the 
world especially due to its contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The American people exhibit a 
profound trust in the military as an institution. We have described how neoliberal policies have 
permeated the United States military. The American military has thus, when one identifies the 
overarching trends in United States military history, experienced a shift from being a provider of 
national security to being a manager of PMSCs who then subsequently become responsible for the 
provision of national security.  
The basis upon which the social contract in relation to security in the United States is founded has 
been reconfigured because it is no longer exclusively the military as the American state’s practical 
extension of the monopoly on violence that provides the security of its citizens but also PMSCs – 
increasingly so. Although the basis upon which the social contract in relation security is build has 
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been altered, we argue that it is not undermined by the reliance on PMSCs because they effectively 
enable the United States military to guarantee the security of the American citizens.  
In this project, we do not examine what implications this might have on democratic control, oversight, 
accountability etc. Instead, we have focused our research on whether the use of PMSCs affect the 
social contract in relation to security of the American state – that is if the contractual relationship 
between a state and civil society and the provision of security is altered in any significant way. We 
ask; if the social contract in relation to security is altered, who might then ensure the security of states’ 
citizens – who might become the ‘new’ practical extension of the state’s monopoly on violence 
instead of the traditional armed forces of states. Our assertion is that the increased use of PMSCs 
illustrates how they gradually are overtaking the practical role of providing the security of a state’s 
citizens from the military. We argue that we can no longer speak of a monopoly of violence, but rather 
a ‘monopsony’ of violence, where states is no longer the sole provider of security. However, we do 
not imply that this necessarily limits states’ authority – as long as the United States military ensures 
that it manages its PMSC contracts probably, the authority of the United States is not affected 
significantly.   
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6. Sierra Leone  
6. 1 Introduction 
We have chosen Sierra Leone as a case study due to, according to Nugent (2007), there are distinct 
social contracts on the African continent that differ from the pre-existing Western and Hobbesian 
notion of the social contract.206 The Hobbesian notion of the social contract and the provision of 
security in many Western states is closely linked to a relationship between the state and an individual. 
In many African countries, this is not the case; instead, the provision of security and thus the 
constellation of the social contract in relation to security is between an individual and communities: 
“[…] the social contract in Africa is not between the state and individuals alone but by individuals 
with their communities and by communities with the state”.207 It would therefore be interesting to 
investigate the social contract in relation to security in an African country, and the possible 
implications the use of PMSCs may have had on the Sierra Leonean state’s authority. As it is argued 
throughout this project, it is not possible to talk about one objective social contract in relation to 
security that applies to all contexts and states. One should rather focus on the country specific details 
that play a role in the configuration, and thereby the reconfiguration of the social contract in regards 
to security, such as history, culture, structure and the involvement of other actors than the state. We, 
furthermore, have chosen Sierra Leone as a case study due to the country’s frequent employment of 
private military and security entities in security provision.   
 
The chapter will commence with a short introduction to the history of Sierra Leone and the societal 
structures within the country. This will then be linked to the social contract in relation to security 
within the country, including the role of the military, government, local chiefs, the use of PMSCs and 
other international actors in the provision of security.  Finally, we will conclude by arguing that the 
deployment of PMSCs in a Sierra Leonean context has helped ensure the Sierra Leonean state’s 
ability to provide the security for its people. Our main finding in regards to the Sierra Leonean case 
study is, in line with Nimkar (2009), that the deployment of the PMSC Executive Outcomes (hereafter 
referred to as EO) in the Sierra Leonean civil war of 1991 can be seen as a positive bolstering of the 
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authority of the Sierra Leonean state.208 The historical background of Sierra Leone shows that the 
tribal chiefs play an important role in Sierra Leone and in the configuration of the social contract in 
relation to security. However, other international actors, such as the British government, NGOS, 
PMSCs etc., have also played an important role in the Sierra Leonean attempt to secure the provision 
of security in the country.   
 
6.2 Historical Background of Sierra Leone 
The origins of the contemporary state of Sierra Leone can be traced back to 1787, when a British 
expedition came to the African continent and bought a piece of land from a local Temne chief.209 
Upon this land, a town called Freetown was founded which was meant to be a “safe-haven” for freed 
slaves and former black soldiers who fought on the British side of the American War of 
independence.210  
From 1808-1864, the original group of black settlers came together with great numbers of rescued 
African slaves from slave ships, and together they became known as the Krios community with up to 
70.000 people as members.211 The group formed their social identity around being Krio - they 
developed their own language, they built Freetown, “[…] and established themselves in some of the 
most important positions in the new society.”212 The Krios became part of the social elite, building a 
strong socio-economic system with different institutions, such as marriage and memberships of secret 
societies.213 While the Krios only dominated Freetown, throughout the rest of the territory of Sierra 
Leone challenging communities and political bodies existed.214 In the southern parts of Sierra Leone, 
one would find communities who adhered to the culture and language of the Mande group.215 
Whereas in the northern parts of the country, the Temne tribes dominated, within which the society 
was formed around the belief in a common ancestor.216 Besides the Temne and Mende societies, 
which comprised about one-third of the population in Sierra Leone, about 13 indigenous tribes can 
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be found within the country today.217 The ethnic diversity of Sierra Leone is therefore evident to this 
day.218  
 
Figure 3 - Map of Sierra Leone 
 
During the 1930s, the Sierra Leonean economy went through a change from a reliance on forest 
products, to an economy based on minerals and diamond mining.219 The restructuring of the economy 
also marked an entrance of private military and security actors in the country. The government of 
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Sierra Leone outsourced the security of their mining fields to private companies in order for the 
government to prevent illegal encroachment.220 
After achieving independence from England in 1961221, the country soon saw itself controlled by a 
one party system - first led by Siaka Stevens and later by his successor General Joseph Momo. 
Widespread corruption led to a steep decline in the quality of the state’s military, economy and the 
rule of law.222 This deterioration of basic state functions affected the young men, and led to large 
groups of them to congregate in the major cities. Here they would smoke marijuana and discuss 
politics, and they became referred to as potes.223 After almost 30 years of this inefficient rule, a former 
army colonel now turned photographer, Foday Sankoh, organized these sizeable groupings of young 
men into what became the Revolutionary United Front (Hereafter referred to as RUF). There was a 
discourse of democracy and system-change within the organization, but the main incentive for these 
young, unemployed men were financial.224  
 
The civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991, when the RUF entered the country from Liberia and 
Burkina Faso. Backed by the Liberian president Charles Taylor, who supplied the RUF with arms 
and training in Liberia, the civil war erupted.225 The RUF quickly gained control of the diamond 
mines in order to fund their side of the civil war. This led the government to start mandatory 
conscription into the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (Hereafter referred to as RSLMF). 
General Momoh increased the standing army of Sierra Leone from 3.000 to 14.000 as a response to 
the RUF’s invasion.226 These conscripts soon became just as big a threat as the RUF to the Sierra 
Leonean populace. Nicknamed “sobels” (soldiers by day, rebels by night) they looted and pillaged 
the villages just as aggressively as the RUF.227 The reason for why these conscripts turned to looting 
and pillaging can be found in the unfortunate confluence of a number of factors. The army’s 
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expansion culminated with calls from the International Monetary Fund (hereafter referred as IMF) 
and the World Bank that the president reduced Sierra Leone’s budget deficit. President Momoh was 
effectively cut off from further loans until he scaled back the budget deficits, and as such, President 
Momoh was unable to finance the expansion of the military and pay his soldiers.228 Mutiny brewed, 
and in 1992, a young Valentine Strasser, and several other officers fed up with the way things were 
going, marched to the capital and overthrew President Momoh.229 Under Strasser, Sierra Leone fell 
deeper into a void of despair. Between 1994 and 1995, a confluence of RUF rebels, sobels, rogue 
military commanders and tribal strongmen had gained control of the country’s valuable diamond and 
agricultural trade, with an estimated turnover of $200 million, whilst the government’s domestic 
revenues only equalled roughly $60 million.230    
 
The government had attempted to bolster the military, but failed in the provision of security. One of 
the main problems of the government troops was that they lacked training and resources; therefore, 
“[…] they used child soldiers and provided rations in the form of marijuana and rum.”231 In 1995, 
the Strasser administration chose to bring in the PMSC Executive Outcomes (hereafter referred to as 
EO) as a means of stemming the insecurity and instability emanating from the RUF’s advances.232 
The deterioration of security in Sierra Leone occurred simultaneously with the end of Apartheid in 
South Africa. The newly elected South African government under the auspices of Nelson Mandela 
struggled with the question of how it was to dismantle the Apartheids-era security establissement. 
Factions of the South African military pursued new commercial opportunities, and thus EO was able 
to recruit personnel from the military’s 32 Battalion – a battalion once charged with aiding Angola’s 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola rebels.233 This meant that EO possessed 
invaluable counterinsurgency skills and was able to re-establish stability in Sierra Leone. The Sierra 
Leone government contracted EO on a one-year contract, paying $35 million dollars. The aim of EO 
was to “[…] re-establish government control over the country”234, and within nine days, EO had 
stopped the RUF advance and pushed the RUF back 126 kilometres.235 EO turned out to be 
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instrumental in defeating the RUF and establish peace in the country, and by 1996, the RUF had been 
forced to the negotiation table and signed a peace treaty on November 30th.236 However, the peace 
agreement included the withdrawal of EO from Sierra Leone, a demand made by the RUF.237   
EO warned the Sierra Leone government about the discontinuation of the contract because it would, 
according to EO, lead to a destabilising of the country, and they predicted that within 100 days of 
their departure a coup was likely to occur.238 The winner of the free election in 1996, Ahmed Kabbah 
still chose to discontinue the contract with EO, and instead he allowed for the UN to deploy troops to 
the country.239  95 days after EO left the country, a coup occurred.240 As a result, the country slipped 
back into civil war when the government was overthrown by “[…] a military junta known as the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)”241 who had allied themselves with the RUF.  
 
From 1997 to 2000, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Hereafter 
referred to as ECOMOG) was charged with the job of bringing peace to the country. The Economic 
Community of West African States (hereafter referred to as ECOWAS) formed ECOMOG in 1990 
as a peacekeeping force.242 It relocated from Liberia to Sierra Leone in 1997 in order to liberate 
Freetown, but the ECOMOG’s efforts were unsuccessful and inflicted the population of the capital 
with many casualties.243  
The initial failures of the ECOMOG forces turned when the PMSC Sandline International (Hereafter 
referred to as Sandline) was contracted to support the ECOMOG forces. This part of the civil war 
took almost 3 years, with many civilian casualties inflicted by both sides. A UN peacekeeping force 
was deployed in 1999, and increased during 2000, as a response to the withdrawal of ECOMOG 
forces. Nevertheless, the UN was not capable of disarming the RUF, and in May 2000, British 
paratroopers were deployed and forced the RUF to sign a peace treaty in November 2000. The British 
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military remains in the country to this day as part of an International Military Assistance Training 
Team, with the main objective of training the national forces of Sierra Leone.244 
 
6.3 The Security Dimension of the Social Contract in Relation to 
External Actors  
Until the beginning of the decolonization process in the 1950s, a large part of Africa remained under 
the military governance of the former European colonizers. However, shortly after the decolonization 
process, many African countries became hotbeds of the on-going Cold War. In the Cold War, the 
African continent had become a quintessential instrument in the conflict. The United States, Russia, 
China, Cuba and many European countries played a prominent role in the African states until the end 
of the Cold War. However, in the beginning of the 1990s, the end of the Cold War rapidly prompted 
the withdrawal of national armies and financial support of those countries from the continent. At the 
same time initiating a military and security vacuum in many parts of Africa, was soon to be filled by 
PMSCs: “During the Cold War, African governments could count on support from the west to quell 
insurrection and rebellions. The withdrawal of western support greatly weakened African 
governments.”245 
 
In 1991, when the RUF took over the control of the mining industry in Sierra Leone, the state 
economy collapsed and the country was close to slipping into a state of insurgency. “At this point 
Capitain Strasser (national leader at the time) looked to the outside world for help, for with no 
diamonds there was no money [...] The source of external assistance would come from Executive 
Outcomes.”246 The deal between the Sierra Leone government and EO was simple: if EO could defeat 
the RUF, the national government of Sierra Leone would grant EO control over the country’s diamond 
mines: “EO was granted mining concessions through DiamondWorks and Branch Energy as partial 
payment for its services for the Sierra Leone government.”247  
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As argued by Nimkar (2009) EO played an important role in the termination of the initial civil war, 
and it resulted in a bolstering of the authority of Sierra Leone by re-establishing security within the 
country. As seen with the deployment of Sandline, it is however not always the case as they were not 
able to secure the country as quickly and efficiently as EO. However, other external actors, as seen 
with the ECOMOG, the UN peacekeeping force, and the British military, also played a key role in 
bolstering the authority of the Sierra Leonean state. 
 
The overall conclusion of the use of PMSCs by the Sierra Leone government throughout the civil war 
is, that when deployed under the right circumstances, as with EO, PMSCs did play an important role 
in securing the authority of Sierra Leone and the provision of security, and thereby the social contract 
in relation to security,  
 
From this, it becomes evident that external actors have played an important role in regards to the 
security provision within the country. Firstly, with the deployment of PMSCs to protect the mining 
fields of the country, and when the civil war broke out and EO was deployed as a means to secure 
stabilisation of the country. Later, the UN and ECOMOG entered, although with an initial lack of 
success, and as of now British military still remains in the country. It therefore becomes apparent that 
the outsourcing of security provision to external actors has become a trend that is now deeply 
ingrained within Sierra Leone. External actors, such as EO, Sandline, the UN and ECOMOG, have 
played important roles in ensuring the stabilisation of the country.  
 
6.4 The Security Dimension of the Social Contract in Relation to 
Internal Actors 
Rothberg (2003) highlights Sierra Leone as a state that “…collapsed in the 1990s”.248 The collapsed 
state displays a “…vacuum of authority” and other actors provide all political goods on an ad hoc 
basis.249 However, the collapsed state is not a permanent condition. The condition can be reversed, 
and the state can reclaim some or all of its authority. Nevertheless, it can also move in the other 
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direction, and lead the state to reassign some of its territory to another actor.  In the mid-1990s, Sierra 
Leone displayed all the characteristics of a collapsed state, with its inability to uphold the fundamental 
functions that the state is relied upon providing; the provision of security for its citizens. The collapse 
of the Sierra Leonean state can be ascribed to the deterioration of a patron-client system of 
governance.250 As mentioned previously, many African states were embedded within the Cold War 
structure and as such, many states, among them Sierra Leone, counted on development aid and loans 
from former colonial powers. This source of income helped the African rulers to finance their 
patronage networks and militaries.251 However, this foreign aid also helped undermine the national 
bureaucracy that, following independence in many African countries, was essential in establishing 
continuity and legitimacy.252 Due to the multiplicity of ethnic tribes and its multicultural history, as 
presented in the first section on Sierra Leone’s history, local chiefs were and, continue to be, an 
integral part of the Sierra Leonean governance structure.253 Especially in rural Sierra Leone, local 
chiefs are the key sources of authority and are generally the only visible element of government.254  
 
According to Albrecht (2012), Sierra Leone was not a productive state that gradually fell a part, but 
is was rather an example of a state “[…]that had historically been integrated with alternative logics 
and forms of power, embodied in part by paramount and lesser chiefs.”255 Because of this 
decentralised governance structure, founded in historical developments, the government of Sierra 
Leone felt compelled to buy the loyalty of ethnically diverse chiefs who controlled resources, as well 
as commanded authority in local communities. Furthermore, the allegiance of these chiefs was needed 
for the effective exercise of power.256 Worried that tribal chiefs could potentially use state institutions 
against the government and threaten the governments hold on power, the Sierra Leonean leaders 
weakened government bureaucracies and manipulated access to resources in order to undermine their 
potential challengers.257 In line with this, Albrecht argues that this means that Sierra Leone is built 
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upon a hybrid order.258 The role of the hybrid societal order, as seen within Sierra Leone, plays an 
important role when discussing the social contract in regards to security. Albrecht (2012) poses the 
question “[…] how might authority be conceptualized when actors such as the paramount and lesser 
chiefs, who are in effect neither state nor non-state, are the primary makers of order?”259 As seen in 
the historical section, external actors have played an important role within the country. However, as 
Albrecht (2012) argues, the local chiefs also act as central players, as Sesay puts it “Sierra Leone 
offers a classical example of a country with a ´strong society´ and ´weak state´.”260 As stated earlier, 
hybridity is the foundation on which the Sierra Leone state was built after their independence in 1961 
that “[…] was forced to behave (externally) as if it was a Weberian (territorial) state.”261  
 
Sierra Leone is not a centralised nation, but rather it is consistent with a “[…] multi-centered system 
of governance in which power assemblages clustered around and were expressed through figures of 
paramount and lesser chiefs”262, which has led to a struggle over authority within rural Sierra 
Leone.263 Albrecht (2012) argues that this hybridity played an important role in how the Sierra 
Leonean state emerged, and subsequently how it collapsed.264 The chiefs of Sierra Leone build their 
authority on both ´symbolic language of stateness´ and ´extreme localism´265, which resulted in a 
“[…] foundational hybrid order (which) is constituted by an ability to draw on both these sources of 
authority.”266 
After the civil war of 1991, the national government started to hold free democratic elections for the 
district councils. This was done in order to restrict the power of the chiefs, as they were perceived to 
have failed their responsibility in relation to the provision of security during the war.  Paul Richards, 
quoted in Jackson (2006), identified abuse of chiefly powers as one of the main drivers behind the 
Sierra Leonean civil war.267 Nevertheless, changes to this governance structure following the 
reconstruction of Sierra Leone after the civil war, did not give rise to the desired effects – the chiefs 
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retained significant influence on the outcomes of elections on both a local and a national level.268 
These local practices all affect the way that the social contract in relation to security in Sierra Leone 
has been and continues to be constructed.  
  
Nugent distinguishes between three different types of the social contract in Africa: the coercive, the 
productive and the permissive, as discussed in chapter 3. In the case of Sierra Leone, it would appear 
that the most prevalent social contract is that of the permissive. This is because of the cultural structure 
of society in Sierra Leone, the foundational hybrid order, where a great deal of power is transferred 
from the government to the local authorities. In Sierra Leone, the communities and the chiefs who 
run the local community mediate the social contract. This decentralised nature of the Sierra Leonean 
governance structure has been seen to “[…] underwrite the authority of the state at the local level 
outside the major town, even where traditional rulers have been supplanted by appointive or 
democratic systems of governance”.269 For example, in southern Sierra Leone, the chiefs are elected 
for life, and only the representatives of the local taxpayers can vote for a chief. The only people who 
are eligible candidates to become chiefs are the members of the founding family in the community. 
The chiefs are viewed as being “[…] ambassadors of their communities”270 where they “[…] 
powerfully mediate the relationship between average citizens and the state, preserving key aspects of 
the traditional two-stage social contract.”271 This is very illustrative of the Sierra Leonean social 
contract in relation to security between the state, the communities and the individual, and reinforces 
our conceptualisation of the social contract as being an ongoing socially constructed process, in which 
local, governmental and external actors play a role.  
 
In conclusion, the social contract in relation to security in Sierra Leone is a “two-stage contract” - 
one between the state and the community, and of one between the community and the individual, as 
seen with the foundational hybrid order. The local communities and its chiefs thus mediate the social 
contract. This construction empowers the local chiefs and community to a much greater degree, than 
a “one-stage contract” between the individual and the state, and to a certain extent, this construction 
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helped the rebels challenge the governments authority. This reinforces our understanding of the social 
contract as being socially constructed and not a universally defined concept.  
 
As an additional payment for their military and security services in the civil war, EO received 
ownership of diamond mines. This created tension between the local chiefs and the national 
government, not only because it contested the two-staged social contract, but also because the Sierra 
Leonean government delegated land where was not seen as theirs to delegate. This led to some of the 
affected communities to support the civil war in the beginning of the conflict. In this sense, in the 
deployment of private military and security actors in the attempt to secure the provision of security, 
the national government of Sierra Leone, from an external point of view, benefited from this 
deployment. In this sense, the deployment of EO, and other private and security actors, bolstered the 
Sierra Leonean state’s authority. However, the foundational hybrid order of the Sierra Leonean 
society suffered in the sense that the local communities supported the RUF as a reaction to the 
perceived overextended prerogative of the Sierra Leonean national government in the deployment of 
PMSCs in the civil war.  
 
6.5 The Role of the Military in Security Provision 
As explained previously, the military can be seen as the practical extension of states’ monopoly on 
violence, and thereby authority. However, in the case of Sierra Leone, the military failed, in the 
beginning of the civil war, to provide the security of civil society, leading to the deployment of EO. 
It is therefore interesting to investigate the official role in securing the social contract in relation to 
security, and the actual historical occurrences. Combined with the historical chapter, it is argued that 
due to structural problems during the beginning of the civil war in 1991, the military, and thereby the 
state, was not able to secure its citizens and thereby adhere to the social contract in regards to security.  
The loyalty of the military in Sierra Leone is often based on ethnicity and the immediate material 
goods that can be provided for the soldiers.272 In the case of Sierra Leone, the lack of payment and 
insufficient material made the soldiers rape and pillage the civilian population, thus eroding the 
legitimacy of the government even further.273 The military, as the practical extension of the Sierra 
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Leonean state’s authority, did not provide security to civil society, and, therefore, the Sierra Leonean 
state did not manage as such to adhere to the security dimension of the social contract. These historical 
and cultural differences, combined with the incompetence of the army, and its leadership, partly 
escalated the conflict and gave rise to the “sobels” mentioned earlier, which greatly undermined the 
authority of the RLSMF and by extension the government.274  
 
In conclusion, the history of the military in Sierra Leone is one that is filled with examples of abuse 
of power, lack of control, inefficiency and corruption. Seen in this perspective, the use of PMSCs has 
constituted a viable option for the Sierra Leonean government, as a way of enabling the government 
to adhere to the social contract in relation to the provision of security.  
 
 
6.6 Sierra Leone's Use of Private Military and Security Companies 
In a Sierra Leonean context, we have categorized the social contract as permissive.275 Indeed the 
national military force (RSMLF) receiving orders from the state could not supply the basic security 
needs Sierra Leone's population could have expected of a productive social contract. A global security 
assemblage was necessary in order to stabilize the country. The complex network of the assemblage 
was here constituted of the military troops of Sierra Leone (RSLMF) representing the official 
government of Sierra Leone, the mining companies (Branch Energy and DiamondWorks) and one 
PMSC (Executive Outcomes). Indeed, “EO’s presence was critical to the maintenance of 
governmental domination and control of Freetown and other mining centers”.276 However, the 
utilization of PMSCs in Sierra Leone remained only a temporary solution for a more stable security 
within the country territory. Selber & Jobarteh (2002) conclude their analysis of the use of PMSCs in 
Sierra Leone by writing that “[…] as long as EO was on the scene, there was a measure of stability 
in Sierra Leone and the government had the upper hand”.277 Which meant that the government could 
provide the security of its citizens, and effectively adhere to the social contract in relation to security.  
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However, EO's part of its contract with RSMLF included the training and the logistical support of 
Sierra Leonean governmental troops. The same troops got involved, after the withdrawal of EO, in 
the looting of the country.278 Consequently, when EO left Sierra Leone the social contract in relation 
to security was breached - not as a result of the employment of a PMSC or other foreign entities, but 
because the government was not able to uphold the social contract in providing security to civil 
society in the country. To uphold the social contract in relation to security, the Sierra Leonean state 
has thus far been dependent on external actors.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
The Sierra Leonean state is a complex one; build upon a foundational hybrid order, in which local 
chiefs together with the national government constitutes a two-staged contract. The adherence of the 
social contract in relation to security does, as a result of the foundational hybrid order, not lie solely 
with the state, but also with the local chiefs.  
As a result of this hybrid order, the effects of the deployment of private military and security actors 
in the provision of security can be seen from two perspectives, the national and the local. The 
deployment of PMSCs, and other external actors, led to a bolstering of the Sierra Leonean state’s 
authority, in that it played a significant role in the re-stabilisation of the country. On the other hand, 
some of the local chiefs believed that the deployment of EO was a breach of the two-staged social 
contract in Sierra Leone, in that it, in their view, was not the national government’s prerogative to 
outsource the provision of security to private military and security actors.   
 
In conclusion, because of the predatory nature of the “sobels”, the social contract was obviously 
broken since the military, as a practical extension of the Sierra Leonean state’s monopoly on violence, 
could not ensure the security of its citizens. However, as portrayed by the Sierra Leonean case study, 
by employing a PMSC, the Sierra Leonean government was able to adhere to the social contract in 
relation to security. As soon as the PMSC left the country, the security dimension of the social 
contract was once again breached in that the Sierra Leonean government was unable to provide 
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security to civil society. This is in line with the main argument of the project, that it does not matter 
which actor provides the security of a state’s citizens, as long as the provision of security is in place. 
7. Japan 
 
7.1 Introduction  
We have chosen Japan as a case study due to the country’s unique standing among the world’s 
Western states, and because of its military. The Japanese state, and thus its military, holds no offensive 
capabilities, and it is therefore interesting to investigate how the Japanese state adheres to the social 
contract and the provision of security.  
 
We commence by briefly introducing the history of Japan, exploring how the social contract in 
relation to security has looked like, and ending with the reaching of a working definition of the 
Japanese social contract in relation to security. The historical context helps to put the question of how 
private military and security companies (hereafter referred to as PMSCs) affect the social contract in 
Japan into perspective. Subsequently, we will outline the nature of the Japanese military, which, by 
and large, has been shaped by the same historical trends that have constructed the security dimension 
of the social contract. We touch upon the importance of the US-Japanese security alliance and its 
impact on Japanese security and defence policy. We will put the nature of the Japanese military into 
perspective by drawing on a survey pinpointing the Japanese publics’ perceptions and opinions 
towards the Japanese military. Understanding the nature of the Japanese military allows us to 
complete the working definition of the social contract because it is the military, as the practical 
extension of states’ monopoly on violence, which guarantees civil society’s protection. Finally, we 
will conclude by commenting on how the Japanese use of PMSCs is unlikely to have any lasting 
effect on the social contract in the immediate future.       
The main points that we will make in regards to Japan is that, although the social contract of Japan 
has been subject to a wide range of alterations throughout the last 60 years, the budding use of PMSCs 
in Japan is not significantly altering the current construction of the social contract in relation to 
security. It can therefore be argued that, as long as the Japanese state protects its citizens, the means 
it uses to do so is irrelevant. What can also be seen by comparing the social contract in Japan to the 
other two cases is that the social contract is country specific, and it is, therefore, not something that 
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can be explained objectively, rather it should be investigated within the history and culture of each 
specific state.  
 
7.2 A Brief History of the Social Contract’s Formation in Japan  
7.2.1 Japan and the Sino-centric world 
Unification, fragmentation, decentralization, expansion and contraction were the order of day during 
the Sino-centric world order that dominated the Far East for more than 2000 years.279 The system was 
a concentric one with China, populated by ethnic Han Chinese, at the centre.280 In the peripheral 
regions, one would find “[…] non-Han, barbarian tributary states”281, who were affected by the 
cycles derived from China’s domestic dynamics and political order and constantly subjugated to these 
dynamics of either expansion or contraction; the use of force was endemic.282 Although varying in 
aggressiveness, mostly due to the relative wealth and military power, China occasionally obliterated 
those peripheral states, which would not submit themselves under China.283 
The Japanese state was one such peripheral state that was exposed to the dynamics of the Sino-centric 
world order.284 The rise and fall of a Chinese dynasty meant heightened or reduced security threats to 
the Japanese state, and when a dynasty collapsed, Japan was freed from its security threats.285 
Although Japan was definitely affected by the dynamics of the Sino-centric system, Japan was never 
fully integrated into it, due to its insularity and natural geographic barriers.286  As a result of this, and 
with an uninterrupted reign of a single monarchy throughout its history, Japan retained its political 
autonomy from the Sino-centric world order and allowed it to mobilize the necessary armed forces 
for possible invasions from the Sino-centric world or prepare for such events.287 When Chinese 
dynasties became expansion-minded, the Japanese state was exposed to an acute sense of security 
threat, and responded by centralizing political power and mobilizing military might.288 Whereas 
during dynastic decline, the Chinese were more inclined to concentrate on internal pressures than 
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pursuing expansion on its maritime frontiers, and in times of dynastic decline the Japanese operated 
a de-centralized political power-structure due to the topographical nature of the Japanese archipelago.  
From this brief introduction of Japan during the Sino-centric world order, we can draw the following 
conclusions concerning the traditional Japanese state identity.  
The Japanese social contract in regards to security evolved around the dynastic cycles of the Sino-
centric world order. Japan was the most successful state in the East Asian region in regards to 
repelling foreign encroachment – the state was strong and competent enough to repel the Europeans 
by using their own political-military inventions against them. The Japanese state identity was 
constructed by its response to the Chinese, and Japan’s independence from the Sino-centric world 
order solidified its sense of being the only unique state in the region with full political autonomy 
under the auspices of an uninterrupted monarchical rule. The pre-modern Japanese social contract 
was fundamentally constructed as a function of the detachment from the Sino-centric world.289  
7.2.2 From a Western Power to a Revisionist Power 
As imperialism became a common occurrence in East Asia, Japan’s traditional state identity shaped 
by the Sino-centric world order began to crumble. The Sino-centric world order began its decline in 
1842, and collapsed altogether in 1895.290 In order to be able to participate in the global inter-state 
system that had been established since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648291, the Japanese 
state’s social contract in general evolved to embrace ideals of the modern Western state.292  
This altercation was characterized by the uprooting of the mandarin bureaucracy and traditional 
military.293 The identity of a ‘new’ Western power made Japan strive in vain to manage the 
disintegrating Sino-centric world order.294 This desire for managing the collapse stemmed in part 
from the fact that Japan was situated at its periphery and hence was vulnerable to the waves of 
change.295 With its newfound outward-looking identity, Japan had a growing economic interest in the 
region such as trade and investments, as well as concerns for the increasing number of expatriates 
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living there and the growing threat of massive refugee flows from China to Taiwan.296 The Japanese 
state therefore frequently interfered in the region’s internal affairs, and even resorted to military 
missions in order to contain instability and disorder.  
During the 1920’s, Japan tried to manage the region’s instability by relying on a multilateral 
approach; the Washington Treaty system, a cooperative arrangement designed to address the China 
question, which meant agreeing to “[…]respect the territorial integrity of China and to carry out 
phased abolition of their imperialist or semi-colonial interests and privileged.”297 The multilateral 
approach effectively kept Japan from acting unilaterally and was indecisive. Consequently, instability 
was allowed to flourish and “[…] having failed to secure its vital security interests through the 
Washington Treaty system”298, Japan gradually broke away from this system and pursued an 
independent, revisionist path that challenged the Western imperialist order, and eventually led to a 
showdown with the United States during WWII.299  To sum up, the Japanese state underwent a 
dramatic transformation during the period of 1868-1945 from a Western power situated in East Asia, 
to a revisionist power that had concluded that the Western inter-state system was unjust due to racism, 
colonialism and imperialism.300       
7.2.3 The Aftermath of WWII and the Presence of America  
After the defeat in WWII, and the subsequent occupation by the United States, the Japanese state 
identity was internally conflictual, and, as a result, Tokyo “[…] never regained its great-power status 
essential to participate in the management of the power structure of the Western inter-state 
system.”301 Instead, Tokyo resigned itself to a probationary status devoid of an independent security 
and foreign policy.302 Domestically, this was illustrated by the American’s draft of a pacifist 
constitution renouncing the right to wage war and the right of belligerency.303 Tokyo was not able to 
amend the constitution partially due to procedural impediments, but mainly because of a “[…] 
bipolarized public opinion on foreign and security policy”304 which divided, and continuous to divide, 
the population into those aspiring to great-power autonomy and those preferring to preserve the 
                                                             
296 Matsumura, M. (2008) p.9 
297 Matsumura, M. (2008) p.10 
298 Matsumura, M. (2008) p.10 
299 Matsumura, M. (2008) p.10 
300 Matsumura, M. (2008) p.10  
301 Matsumura, M. (2008) p.11 
302 Matsumura, M. (2008) p.11 
303 The Japanese Ministry of Defence – “The Constitution of Japan” (12.12.2013). Available at: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp01.html   
304 Matsumura, M. (2008) p.11-12  
65 
 
essence of pacifism.305 Japan effectively ‘suffered’ from conflicting state identities during and after 
the Cold War. 
7.2.4 The American Occupation 
Japan was occupied by the United States from 1945 up until April 28 1952, when the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty came into effect.306 During the occupation, Japan was subject to a wide array of political, 
economic, military and educational reforms that were part of a broader democratization and 
demilitarization scheme.307  
It was a development that seemed highly unlikely when the sun set on Pearl Habour on 7 December 
1941. However, it was made perfectly clear in the State-War-Navy directive, issued on 29 August 29 
1945, that the Supreme Commander (General MacArthur, red.) would exercise his authority through 
the Japanese government, as well as the Emperor, as long as it met US objectives.308 The Americans 
decided on a top-bottom approach to the reconstruction of Japan where it was the Japanese 
government’s task to govern on the basis of the objectives it had been presented by the Supreme 
Commander. The answer to why the United States chose such an approach can be found in the 
following statement from General Hilldring:  
“The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the national government are 
enormous. If there were no Japanese Government available for our use, we would have to 
operate directly the whole complicated machine required for the administration of a country of 
seventy million people. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By 
cleaning up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool we are saving our time and 
our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the Japanese to do their own 
house-cleaning, but we are providing the specifications.”309  
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It was also a practical arrangement; by utilizing governmental machinery and agencies, which were 
already in place, the United States saved time, manpower and resources310. United States resources 
and manpower were already stretched to the limit due to the reconstruction of Europe.  
In 1951, the United States and Japan signed a bilateral security treaty that marked the end of the 
American occupation of Japan, and a shift in American policy towards East Asia. However, even 
though the San Francisco Peace Treaty had come into effect, the American administration were not 
prepared to give up its presence in Japan altogether. Japan became a key strategic partner in East Asia 
in the Cold War, and American forces remained in place throughout Japan.311  
The Cold War had descended upon the world and the strategy of democratization and decentralization 
of power, which had been prevalent in Japan right after the war, was replaced by an approach that 
was meant to turn Japan into a leading proponent of the West, in East Asia.312 The necessity of a 
military bulwark against communism in East Asia became a fact, and the Japanese economy was to 
be stabilized in order to secure economic growth in the region. However, the rise of the communist 
party in China made the prospects of expanding economic relations with China, as a way of reviving 
the Japanese economy, highly unlikely. The revival of the Japanese economy was instead to be 
secured by linking it to Southeast Asia. This alone did not guarantee that Japan evolved into a centre 
of the anti-communist economic sphere in Asia, and therefore Japan was exempted from carrying any 
military burden.  In order to avoid any unnecessary strains on the Japanese economy, or limit the 
speed of the economic recovery, Japan’s military burden was significantly reduced - the military 
burden was absolved when the brunt of American bases were placed on Okinawa.313 The Japanese 
mainland was therefore able to direct all its resources on promoting economic growth.  
As for the United States, the American administration was interested in reducing government budget 
deficits while at the same time maintaining global military hegemony. According to Buist (2010), 
this was achieved through a division of labour between Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. 
The American policy regarding East Asia was a highly militarized one, except towards Japan where 
emphasis came to be on economic recovery. During the first years of the Eisenhower administration, 
Japan was expected to become not only an economic powerhouse for the East Asian region, but also 
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a military one. The worsening of the East Asian situation in 1953, made the United States warm to 
the idea of large-scale re-militarization of Japan. A growing anti-base peace movement against 
American bases in Japan, as well as the shared fear in other Asian countries the re-militarization of 
Japan would lead to a new era of Japanese imperialism, however, thwarted these attempts. The 
military burden of defence against both China and North Korea therefore fell on South Korea, Taiwan 
and Okinawa during the mid-1950s. Instead, mainland Japan was left to take on the role of a centre 
for economic growth.314   
7.2.5 The Social Contract and the Post-Cold War Era 
The ambiguity in state identity made it impossible for the Japanese state to recapture the integrity of 
historical outlook and value-system of a great power that are the prerequisites to formulating foreign 
and security policies, and for exercising unilateral use of military might when necessary.315 Tokyo 
accepted the United States presence in the country, and became the ‘junior’-partner in a bilateral 
alliance. Japan allowed for this constellation in order to be able to exploit the security alliance and 
secure the Japanese reconstruction and development.316 Instead, Tokyo pursued a path of niche-
diplomacy consistent with the nature of a middle power.317 When Washington in the 1980s pressured 
Tokyo into undertaking a heavier economic and military burden in the security alliance, domestic 
controversy erupted.318 Two discourses ensued; one that emphasized Japan as a ‘civilian great power’ 
and one that envisioned Japan as a ‘normal’ state.319 The pacifist discourse of a civilian great power 
has been persistent and, as a result, Tokyo has consistently obliged itself to commit to the pacifist 
discourse, even though it is increasingly becoming contested.320 During the Cold War, the world 
experienced stability due to the bipolar nature of the international system, but today the Japanese state 
once more faces new global and regional security challenges.321 Tokyo remains a ‘prisoner’ of 
existing and constitutional pacifist arrangements that outlaws the use of force, and which has 
effectively ‘straitjacketed’ Japan’s foreign and security policy. Japan has already reached the bounds 
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of legal manoeuvring in favour of the United States, who is now a proponent of a more decisive 
Japanese role in regional and security matters.322 
To sum up, Japanese state identity has, during and after the Cold War, evolved around United States 
hegemony. Inconsistency, integrity and unity have been abundant due to the bipolarized nature of the 
state identity debate in Japan as either a pacifist ‘civilian great power’ or a ‘normal’ autonomous 
state.323      
 
7.3 The Constitution and the Right to Self-Defence 
Japan is a most remarkable nation – highly developed and thoroughly industrialized. In many ways, 
Japan resembles many of its Western liberal contemporaries; however, it does have one distinctive 
feature that sets it apart. One of the most distinctive characteristics of the Japanese state is its 
‘monopoly of violence’.324 States’ military is the practical ‘extension’ of that monopoly. The 
intriguing thing regarding Japan is that neither the military nor the executive power. The Japanese 
state does not hold any offensive capabilities – the Japanese forces are thus effectively called the 
Japanese Self- Defence Forces.   
Japan has managed to transform itself into a “[…] peace-loving nation far from the miseries of 
war”.325 The foundation of this newfound pacifism was laid in the signing of the Constitution on May 
3rd 1947. The preamble of the Japanese Constitution reads: 
“We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high 
ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security, and 
existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire 
to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, 
and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the 
earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from 
fear and want.”326   
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Under the guidance of the Americans, determined to ensure that the horrors of war would never be 
repeated, the Japanese government worked tenaciously to establish Japan as a pacifist nation. In order 
to neutralize Japan and limit the possibilities of new aggressions in the future, the Americans worked 
towards severely limiting the scope of Japans military. These constraints are set out in Article 9 of 
the Constitution and reads: 
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force 
as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”327 
 
However, the provisions provided by Article 9 do not omit the inherent right to self-defence that 
Japan is entitled to as a sovereign state under international law. This has been taken to mean that 
Article 9 allows for a minimum of armed forces necessary to execute the right of self-defence.328 
Based on such an interpretation, the Japanese government has developed an exclusively defence-
oriented policy as its focal policy in national defence – effectively called the Self-Defence Forces. 
Although the provisions of Article 9 have been interpreted in this way, the self-defence capabilities 
possessed and maintained by Japan under the Constitution, remains limited to the minimum necessary 
level for self-defence. The Japanese government emphasises that the specific level of self-defence 
capabilities perceived as necessary for upholding the minimum level of self-defence, differs 
according to the prevailing international situation, technology available etc.329 The minimum level of 
self-defence is discussed and decided upon according to annual budgets and in relation to other 
conditions set out by the Japanese Diet330 on behalf of the people of Japan. Whether or not the level 
of armed strength corresponds to ‘war potential’ prohibited explicitly by Article 9 depends on the 
total strength that the Japanese state possesses and maintains.331 It follows that whether or not the 
Self-Defense Forces are allowed to acquire certain armaments, is decided according to whether the 
total strength will or will not exceed the constitutional limit. No matter what, it is conceived as 
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unconstitutional to possess any offensive capabilities whatsoever that by their mere performance are 
intended for the total destruction of other countries, because such weapons instantly exceed the 
minimum threshold necessary for self-defence.    
 
7.4 The Basics of Japan’s Security and Defence Policy 
In the introduction of the 2013 annual white paper; Defense of Japan, it is pointed out that, “[…] the 
independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to maintain the determining of its own 
direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as its culture, tradition, and sense of values.”332  
However, as the white paper points out, peace, safety and independence cannot be guaranteed by 
either wishful thinking or trust in the good intentions of other nations.333 According to the white paper 
(2013), the current international climate suggests that it is not always realistic to put one’s faith in 
diplomatic negotiations or other non-military means as a way of preventing outside intervention. As 
of now, defence capabilities remains Japan’s ultimate guarantee of security alongside the provision 
of security provided by the US-Japan security alliance, and the Japanese government therefore strives 
to develop proper defence capabilities to protect the lives and assets of the public, and to defend the 
territorial land, sea, and airspace of Japan.   
In order to secure proper defence capabilities, Japan has strengthened the already existing Japanese-
US security pact.334  The white paper (2013) emphasises that the peace and security of Japan is 
ensured through the development of seamless defence measures that are to be coupled with the pre-
existing Japan-US security arrangements.335 In addition, the white paper (2013) also points out that 
Japan operates domestically to enrich the backbone of its people, which is done by ensuring stable 
lifestyles for the people and protecting the country, whilst working to implement measures in the 
educational and economic sectors to prevent future invasions.336  
Lately, however, Shinzo Abe’s government has shown its willingness to revise, or at least expand the 
mandate of Article 9 of the Constitution.337 This is due to the increasing, perhaps perceived, instability 
of the East Asian region, especially brought on by the rise of China and countless disputes over small 
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islets and islands. The desire to revise the Constitution, in particular Article 9, also stems from a 
desire to be able to aid Japan’s close ally the United States in case of an aggression or attack.338 The 
Japanese government highlights how, under international law, collective self-defence is recognised 
as a state’s inherent right, and that the use of armed force to stop an armed attack on an ally, although 
the state in question is not itself under direct attack, is allowed. It is therefore pointed out that Japan 
as a sovereign state enjoys the right to collective self-defence as provided under international law.  
However, as of now, Japan is not allowed to exercise this right due to the provisions of the 
Constitution.339  
The security arrangements between the United States and Japan have continued to reiterate, and 
Japan’s pivot towards a re-militarization may be a reaction to pressures from Washington. After the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington’s resources have been spread thin and the American 
administration therefore hopes that Japan will begin to take over some of the military expenditures 
associated with the East Asian region.340  
However, the political establishment in Japan need to be wary of a total pivot towards re-militarization 
of the country. As illustrated in the following section, no politician will find sufficient popular support 
for such a policy, because the pacifist discourse runs deep in the Japanese society.    
 
7.5 Japanese attitudes towards the Self-Defense Forces 
The processes of democratization and demilitarization that the Americans instigated when arriving in 
Japan after WWII was one that was meant to teach the Japanese Western liberal ideas of democracy. 
These ideals have become extremely ingrained in the Japanese consciousness, and have formed the 
Japanese’s collective understanding of their country.  
The book “American Culture” (1980) offers a description of how America, since WWII, has 
continued to permeate the Japanese culture in one way or another.341 The immediate period after the 
war was characterized by a Love/Hate attitude towards America.342 During the Cold War, a vibrant 
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jazz scene emerged in the vicinity of American bases, and in order to maintain the “American Dream” 
that was held by many Japanese at the time, overseas concert tours of black jazz musicians were 
promoted. Hollywood movies became the most effective anti-communist propaganda tool and 
through movies and music, the Japanese audiences were influenced by American ideals of ‘freedom’ 
and affluence.343 In the 1950s, American TV-shows began to air for the first time in Japan and they 
exceeded movies in propagating ideas because they managed to reach people in their living rooms.344  
The Japanese audiences envisaged their futures as bright and prosperous as the lives of the characters 
portrayed in the American soap operas. However, in the 1970s, America had ceased to be the object 
of desire and was instead consulted as a source of information about the latest global trends.345 
Americanization was not only a result of the presences of the American military and political 
administration that had been imposed on the Japanese, it was also a process of deep structural changes 
embedded in the emotions and desires of the Japanese people. To the Japanese, America provided 
them with a convincing answer to the void left in their collective psyche by war defeat.346 The 
Japanese were able to reconstruct their own sense of national identity through the desire and at the 
same time their antipathy towards America.347 The United States was able to project soft-power in 
relation to Japan and because of the security pact of 1951 the Japanese were receptive, appreciative 
and showed affirmation for American ideas and practices.348 
Although the ideals of peace and pacifism have permeated the Japanese society following WWII, and 
as a direct consequence of the Constitution, the Japanese government is seeking a 3 % increase in 
military expenditures for 2014 for the first time in 22 years.349 Professor John W. Traphagan (2012) 
points out in a commentary in The Diplomat that there exists a seemingly ‘disconnect’ on how Japan 
is perceived concerning its military might. Traphagan (2012) points out that he often leaves people 
dumbfounded when asking the question; “Do you know where Japan ranks internationally in terms 
of defense spending?”350 Most people assume that Japan ranks fairly low on that list, when in fact 
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Japan are within the top ten countries worldwide in regards to military expenditure (see figure 1.1).351 
When intentionally using the word “guntai” to describe Japan’s military, Traphagan (2012) points 
out that he is regularly corrected and that the correct term is “jietai”.  In the eyes of the average 
Japanese, the US has a ‘guntai’, or proper military force, whereas Japan with offensive capabilities 
only has a jietai, or self-defense force. As Traphagan (2012) points out, this distinction is not trivial 
but instrumental in determining the construction of the social contract between the Japanese state and 
its citizens. The military in Japan is conceived of as a strictly defensive military that internationally 
is committed to helping people in other countries but not to wage war. It is interesting to note that 
concerning recruiting advertisements, the Self-Defense Forces are typically portrayed as providing 
medical assistance or engaging in rescue and search missions, domestically and overseas.352 Contrary 
to Japan’s security alliance partner the United States, it is difficult to imagine recruitment posters or 
advertisements depicting members of the Self-Defense Force as warriors. The perception of the 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces as warriors does not sit well with the Japanese public and they are 
therefore more often than not identified as mere defenders or helpers of Japan.  
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The imposition of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution meant that the Japanese officially renounced 
both their right to declare war as well as the maintenance of a regular military. Japan has a long history 
of imperialism and expansionism, and in feudal times society was arranged according to the will of 
the military Shogunates; the so-called samurai rulers.353 The reason why Japan in the end adopted 
these ideals of democracy, peace and pacifism can be ascribed to the process of Iitoko-Dori354.  
The Japanese have a long history of adopting the most useful elements of foreign cultures and making 
it their own.355  Japan was able to achieve rapid economic growth because a comprehensive American 
East Asian policy that allowed Japan to direct all its attention towards stabilizing the economy. In 
addition, during the Tokugawa period, cottage industries and financial systems were already well in 
place – creating a sound foundation for accepting Western technology.356  
Not many years passed after the American occupation of Japan when the Americans concluded that 
Japan would embrace the Western liberal ideals of democracy, and thus no longer present a military 
threat in the future.357 This development, and the imminent threat from communist China, led the 
United States government to pressure the Japanese into re-militarization and to join with the United 
States in a military alliance.358 The Japanese government obliged, and soon after the security alliance 
between the United States and Japan was formalized. Nonetheless, the Japanese population was not 
as susceptible as the government. According to Traphagan (2012), most Japanese take the fact that 
the country has renounced the right to declare war and the right to maintain a “proper” military quite 
seriously. In the eyes of the Japanese, the task of the Self-Defense Forces is strictly to defend the 
Japanese archipelago and not taking part in any offensive operations whatsoever. For the Japanese 
government it became increasingly difficult to justify the rationale behind sending off Japanese troops 
to distant and war-torn countries and aligning this with the nature of a purely defensive force.  
To sum up, while the Japanese government throughout the last couple of decades has tried to 
circumvent the rigid interpretation of Article 9, the Japanese public has taken the notion of Japan as 
a country that has renounced war and does not maintain a ‘proper’ military to heart. Article 9 has 
become deeply culturally ingrained in the Japanese public similarly to that of the Bill of Rights in the 
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US. Article 9 is simply something that contributes to the Japanese understanding of what is inherently 
Japanese and defines the nation.359   
 
7.6 The Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and 
Defence Issues 
A 2012 survey by the Public relations Office “Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces 
(SDF) and Defense Issues” supports Traphagan’s assessment. The survey was conducted across Japan 
with 3.000 respondents aged 20 and above. The main and most decisive findings of the survey was 
the respondents’ opinion of and interest in the Self-Defense Forces (hereafter referred to as SDF) and 
defence issues, their impressions of the SDF, their thoughts on defence systems, and consciousness 
toward the roles and activities of the SDF.  
An overwhelming majority of the respondents identified disaster relief dispatch (Rescue activities in 
times of disaster and/or emergency transport of patients, etc.) as the main role and activity of the SDF. 
This understanding of the SDF was up from 78.4 % in 2009 to 82.9 % in 2012.360 Respondents also 
replied that the SDF should increasingly focus their efforts on said activities in the future – in 2009, 
73.8 % expressed a desire for increased efforts in this field, rising to 76.3 % in 2012.361 Furthermore, 
in regard to supporting international peace cooperation activities, 28.1 % as of January 2012 were 
supportive of more efforts in engaging proactively in such activities, whereas the majority were 
satisfied with the current level of engagement (61.3 %).362  
 
Another interesting finding in the survey is that the Japanese are not more inclined to join the SDF in 
case of an invasion or in the case of external aggression, than they are in peacetime.  People stating 
“I will join the SDF to fight (volunteer to join the SDF and fight as a SDF member)” has only 
increased by 4 percent points from 6.2 % in January 2009 to 6.6 % in January 2012.363 The majority 
of the respondents were ready to assist the SDF in the event of an invasion but would not join as 
volunteers. This stance was up from 49.6 % in 2009 to 56.6 % in 2012.364 In line with the overall 
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pacifism of the Japanese society, 18.9 % of respondents stated that they would conduct resistance 
without the use of force in the face of an invasion.365  
This survey presents an overall albeit not definitive picture of the Japanese peoples relationship to 
their armed forces. One of our main findings is that the social contract in regards to security has been 
intricately linked to US foreign and security policy since WWII.  
  
In the following we will discuss whether the use of PMSCs can potentially disrupt the stability within 
the Japanese society and have any effect on the social contract in regards to security.  
 
7.8 PMCs, the Monopoly on Violence and the Social Contract 
Due to the collective security pact between the United States and Japan, brought on by the events of 
WWII, one could raise the question of whether the Japanese state’s monopoly of violence has been 
compromised, and to what extent the transfer of Japanese military capabilities to the United States 
has affected the social contract in regards to security between the Japanese civil society and the state.  
The Asian Century Institute emphasizes how in the aftermath of WWII “Japan established a new 
social contract for the management of its society and economy, perhaps one of the most complex 
social contracts of all. Japanese citizens surrendered their individual freedoms to a much greater 
extent than most countries.”366  
The Japanese state’s monopoly on violence was furthermore confounded when the United States 
Navy recently selected the Canadian PMSC CAE to provide the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 
with KC-130R aircrew and maintenance training services, including academic and live flight training 
to pilot, flight engineer, navigator, loadmaster, and maintenance personnel. The PMSC will also 
provide academic training, which will take place at their Florida C-130 Training Center. Furthermore, 
the PMSC will also be in charge of conducting live flight training on the Japanese KC-130R aircraft 
that will be executed throughout various locations within the U.S. with follow-on training services in 
Japan.367 
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In addition to the CAE contract, the American PMSC Lockheed Martin has recently been awarded a 
$29.5 million contract by mutual agreement between the United States and Japan to upgrade the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force’s ballistic missile defence systems.368 The PMSC has been awarded 
more than $400 million in contracts to upgrade the ballistic missiles systems of Japanese destroyers. 
In 2004, Japan requested upgrades and logistics support for its AEGIS Weapons System and AEGIS 
Ballistic Missile Defense Vertical Launch System ORDALT.369 Then, in 2005, the American PMSC 
Lockheed Martin was awarded a $124 million contract to upgrade the Japanese AEGIS Destroyer JS 
Kongo in order to upgrade it to AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense Block capabilities. An interesting 
fact is that the contract was awarded by the Naval Sea System Command in Washington D.C who 
acted as the Japanese government’s agent because of the mutual security alliance outlined by the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952.370  
In 2006, the Japanese handed in further requests for a Standard-family naval air and missile defence 
systems, and further destroyer and BMD upgrades. The requests final worth was estimated at around 
$528 million and the main contenders for the contracts were Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and BAE.371 
The first round of contracts amounted to $458 million and the next round amounted to $70 million. 
Lockheed Martin was to be in charge of the upgrades to the BMD systems, BAE was to upgrade the 
AEGIS BMD Vertical Launch System ODALT and finally Raytheon was to provide 9 SM-3 Block 
IA Standard Missiles. Subsequently, Lockheed Martin was awarded more follow-up contracts. All 
these upgrades were part of a 9-year scheme, which was to end in 2014. The US pledged to finance 
the scheme with 1.1-1.5 billion and Japan would finance it with 1-1.2 billion. However, the upgrades 
have been postponed to technical difficulties and the upgrade scheme has therefore been extended to 
2016. Finally, in 2012 Japan requested additional upgrades to its 2 Atago Class AEGIS destroyers 
with an estimated cost of 421 million. In 2013, Lockheed Martin received an additional contract worth 
65 million to provide these upgrades.372      
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Although the use of PMSCs in Japan at the present stage is not used in its thousands like in the United 
States, the Japanese government has in the past few years upgraded the capabilities of the Japanese 
Maritime Self-Defense Force by contracting out services to PMSCs.373 It is important to bear in mind 
though that these PMSCs have only provided support and logistical assistance to the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces and has thus have not engaged in any offensive activities. The defensive nature of the 
services that these PMSCs provide are due to the defensive nature of the Japanese military.     
However, one might argue that Japan, due to its close ties and the security alliance with the United 
States, is increasingly being affected by the United States’ extensive use of PMSCs. 
Even though Japan might begin to use PMSCs, as of now the use of PMSCs is rather limited but this 
can also be ascribed to the fact that focus is not as extensive on the use of PMSCs in a Japanese 
context as it is in the United States. In the United States, incidents like the Nissour Square shootings 
and the notorious Blackwater’s involvement in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, have been adding to 
an intensified coverage of the issues regarding PMSCs374. As we have shown in the previous sections, 
the social contract in regards to security in Japan remains stable, and the constellation of the military 
and the relationship between state, military and its citizens can therefore be thought to have a limiting 
effect on the willingness to use PMSCs.  
If we have to turn our attention towards probable objections to our analysis, some critics would 
potentially point out that the social contract in Japan is anything else than strong. Their question 
would be as to how can a social contract can be stable when in fact the provisions of Article 9 of the 
Constitution severely limit the Japanese state’s monopoly on violence. We have described the military 
as the practical extension of the Japanese state and its monopoly on violence, so when the military’s 
mandate is limited to defensive capabilities, can the Japanese state then guarantee the security of its 
citizens. Although the Japanese military have a rather limited mandate compared to other countries, 
they still provide the defence of Japan. In case of aggression towards the Japanese archipelago, they 
will respond according to the principle of self-defence laid out by international law. In addition, if 
Japan is attacked the country will be aided by the US who is obligated to do so under the 1951 security 
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alliance pact.375 Therefore, one might argue that although the Japanese military’s mandate is limited, 
the Japanese state does provide the necessary security of its citizens.   
 
7.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how, although there is a considerable tendency internationally to employ 
PMSCs, Japans use of PMSCs remains sporadic at best. Although the Japanese people are positive 
towards their Self-Defense Forces, the soldier does not enjoy a great deal of respect due to the 
pacifism embedded culturally in the Japanese society. The restricted mandate of the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces is the main reason for the limited use of PMSCs. The use of PMSCs, often employed 
in distant and far off countries, would not find popular support amongst regular Japanese who are 
very wary of the re-militarization of Japan or expanding the mandate of Article 9 under the 
Constitution. The Japanese people see their military primarily as a defensive force committed to the 
defence of the Japanese archipelago and not as an offensive military. Therefore, PMSCs in Japan do 
not have a significant impact on the social contract in regards to security. However, if calls for an 
expansion of the Article 9 mandate are amplified and threats from China persists, one might find that 
PMSCs will come to play a more central role in Japan especially as a way of making up for the lacking 
interest of the Japanese people of entering the Self-Defense Forces. In order to amplify and expand, 
the Japanese government may turn to PMSCs to fill this deficit in the future. Finally, this might also 
be the case seeing that the Japanese society is greying and the demographics may entail that the 
Japanese government may have to look elsewhere to fill the need of its Self-Defense Forces 
consequently contracting out to the private military and security industry. Nevertheless, as such, the 
authority of the Japanese state and essentially the provision of security has not been altered by the 
use of PMSCs. The provision of security can thus far be ascribed to one of the most successful 
bilateral relationships of the twentieth century namely that of the United States and Japan. This is in 
line with the overall argument of this project namely that as long as the security provision of civil 
society is upheld, it does not matter which means a state utilizes in order to provide national security.  
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8. Conclusion  
Based on empirical data, we are able to make empirical generalisations about how the use of private 
military and security companies affects the social contract in relation to security provision, and 
consequently states’ authority. In the case studies, we have found that the social contract in relation 
to security has evolved from being expressed through the monopoly of violence of states, to being 
expressed by being a monopsy of violence where multiple actors become responsible for the provision 
of security.     
Our conceptualization of the social contract in relation to security maintains that as long as states 
provide security, and thereby adheres to the social contract in relation to security, the means through 
which it does so are irrelevant. How states provide security is therefore their prerogative, and thereby 
contextual. Moreover, the social contract is a social construction, and thus the social contract in states, 
in this research Japan, the United States and Sierra Leone, are construed differently. The authority of 
states and the provision of security are therefore different, and will be affected differently by the 
privatisation of security.    
The heavy reliance on PMSCs by states around the globe is a rather new phenomenon, even though 
private military and security actors previously have played a role in warfare, which has been 
exacerbated by the end of the Cold War and the surplus of laid-off military personnel, the prevalence 
of neoliberalism and the emergence of new security threats across the globe. PMSCs are corporate 
entities that are driven by profit and are therefore not bound to any state - only the commercial contract 
binds states and PMSCs. Before the establishment of the Westphalian world order, mercenaries 
roamed the European continent. PMSCs have been used in the Balkans, and especially by the United 
States administration in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.   
In the United States, the social contract in relation to security was established by the signing of the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The government of the United States thereby 
effectively became in charge of the provision of national security. However, if the government was 
not up to this task, the American civil society retained the right to bear arms in order to defend 
themselves in case security was not provided; secured by the second amendment of the United States 
Constitution. During the 1980s, neoliberalism picked up and neo-liberal policies subsequently came 
to permeate the United States military. This led to a change in the basis upon which the social contract 
in relation to security of the United States was founded. The social contract in relation to security 
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changed from being based on the military as the practical extension of the American state’s monopoly 
on violence, when the military shifted from being the sole provider of security to being a manager of 
security due to the increasing reliance on PMSCs. However, the American state is still providing 
security, and therefore the American state still adheres to the social contract in relation to security.  
In Japan, the social contract in relation to security previously evolved around the Sino-centric world 
order. Eventually, after the collapse of the Sino-centric world order the Japanese state turned towards 
the West and adopted Western liberal ideals. However, the waves of change brought on by the 
collapse of the Sino-centric world order, threatened the Japanese national security and Japan was 
subsequently left to fend for itself and embraced a revisionist path that led to a showdown between 
the United States and Japan during WWII. The aftermath of WWII brought about widespread reform 
in Japan, and due to the imposition of a pacifist Constitution by the Americans, Japan evolved to 
being a pacifist nation renouncing all offensive capabilities normally ascribed to a sovereign state. 
Due to these constitutional constraints, the mandate of the Japanese military remains rather limited, 
and hence the reliance on PMSCs by the Japanese military has not been significant. However, changes 
in the region have heightened the security threat of Japan, and Japan has therefore strengthened the 
US-Japan security alliance. Subsequently, in Japan, a monopsy of violence prevails because the 
United States partakes in the provision of the security of the Japanese civil society and not exclusively 
the Japanese military (consequently called the Self-Defense Force). This arrangement aligns with our 
main argument that as long as security is provided for, it does not matter which actor(s) provides it.   
In Sierra Leone, the social contract in relation to security differs from that of the United States and 
Japan where the social contract has generally been construed as a bond between the state and the 
individual. Due to its history and the multiplicity of tribes, the Sierra Leonean social contract in 
relation to security is two-fold compromising both a relationship between the state and the individual, 
and one between the individual and the local community. As a result of the foundational hybrid order 
upon which the Sierra Leonean social contract in relation to security is build, the outsourcing of the 
provision of security to the PMSC Executive Outcome resulted in conflicts between the Sierra 
Leonean state and so of the local chiefs. The local chiefs did not see it is as the prerogative of the 
Sierra Leonean state to outsource the provision of security.  
To sum up, we have explored how PMSC as an actor on the international stage affects states’ authority 
and the provision of security. To broaden our project, we now turn to a discussion of if international 
actors, exemplified in international organisations (hereafter referred to as IOs), affect states’ authority 
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in the same manner as PMSCs. In order to move away from viewing states’ authority solely in relation 
to the provision of security and the monopoly of violence, we will investigate and discuss if 
international actors, exemplified in IOs, affect states’ authority in areas not directly related to the 
provision of security.  
8.1 International Actors Effect on States’ Authority  
As argued within this project, the social contract in relation to security cannot be viewed objectively 
- rather it should be investigated within the context it is situated, thereby bearing in mind the history 
and culture of the given state. The findings of this project also shows that the privatisation of security, 
exemplified in the use of PMSCs, affects the social contract differently and thereby states’ authority. 
However, as long as security is provided, the means through which the security provision is done is 
irrelevant.   
After having investigated the effects of PMSCs on the social contract in relation to security, and 
consequently states’ authority, this section will try to broaden the discussion of the problem 
formulation by investigating whether international actors effect states’ authority in the same manner 
as PMSCs. Having chosen to work within a social constructivist framework, this is an obvious aspect 
to investigate, since social constructivism recognises“[…] states as social entities, shaped in part by 
International social action.”376 The following will therefore be a discussion about how and if 
international actors affect the states’ authority, and if this is in the same manner as PMSCs.  
Although recognising that within our conceptualisation of the social contract there is a great emphasis 
on the provision of security, an investigation as to whether or not there are other aspects than the 
monopoly of violence can affect states’ authority is the next logical step. It is argued that IOs, as 
carriers of norms, affect the states’ authority in areas not linked to states’ monopoly on violence. 
Furthermore, it is argued that states, when interacting with IOs, NGOs and other international actors, 
both inhabit and create the social universe in which they act. Therefore, that there are some processes 
in which the influence stemming from international actors, which results in a change of behaviour of 
states, is detectable. Rather than seeing this as a sign of a loss of states' authority, it is argued that 
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when being a part of the international society, as stated by Wendt (1994), states become ´international 
states´ which constitutes “[…] a structural transformation of the Westphalian states system.”377  
As mentioned earlier within in this project, neo-liberal policies have led to a privatisation of security. 
However, it is not only in relation to security that privatisation has had an effect. Previously the 
sovereign state, “[…] simply entered into relations with its counterparts in other countries, forging 
alliances, signing treaties or issuing declarations of war.”378 Within this framework, there was a clear 
distinction between the “inside” of the state, in which the sovereign state had control over its territory, 
and with the “outside” of the state, within which the state interacted with other states.379 However, 
with globalisation a more complex situation has emerged in which “[…] the demarcation line 
between the inside and outside has become very blurred.”380 This is due to the fact that “[…] states, 
international organisations, NGOs and private firms are increasingly forced to interact with each 
other.”381 Therefore, this section of the project will not distinguish between the different international 
actors, such as IOs, NGOs etc., but rather it will be discussion of how, if at all, states’ authority is 
affected when interacting with international actors. 
According to Anna Leander (2001), globalisation and the emergence of many supranational and 
multinational organisations has led to “[…] the dual effects of displacing politics and of diffusing 
authority, thereby diminishing the states legitimacy and capacity to monopolise violence 
respectively”382. Leander further argues that the increasingly international point of view in regards to 
political boundaries and the “[…] privatisation of formerly public regulation”383 leads to a weakening 
of the claim from states on the monopoly of violence. According to Leander, the shift in authority 
from states to the different international actors has also led to a “[…] undermining of the state 
capacity for legitimate violence.”384  
However, although recognising the views put forth by Leander (2001), the process of globalisation 
and the effects this has on the displacing of politics and states’ authority, a “more constructivist 
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orientation”385 of these processes is used within this section as a result of the methodological approach 
within this project. Leander (2001) is mainly focusing on how the monopoly of violence in relation 
to states’ authority is affected by states being a part of the international society, whereas this is an 
investigation how and if states’ authority is affected by interacting with international actors. 
Therefore, in the next section we will argue why international actors, exemplified in Barnett and 
Finnemore’s definition of IOs, have authority to affect state’s authority due to the rational, legal 
authority inherent in IOs bureaucracies.   
Barnett & Finnemore (1999) argue that IOs should be seen as powerful actors in the world386 because 
of their influence on states: “IOs can become autonomous sites of authority, independent from the 
state “principals” who may have created them.”387 As seen here, IOs embody an authority that can 
challenge states’. The weight of IO bureaucracies, according to Weber, stems from the fact that they 
“[…] embody a form of authority, rational-legal authority that modernity views as particularly 
legitimate and good”388. The authority is seen as rational “[…] in that it deploys socially recognized 
relevant knowledge to create rules that determine how goals will be pursued”389. It is this rationality 
that makes people “[…] willing to submit to this kind of authority.”390 From this, it is possible to 
argue that if IOs are dominating within the international society they also have the ability to affect 
states’ authority.  
The argument put forth by Armstrong (1998) is not refuting the arguments that there are processes, 
which can be described as globalisation, in the world today. However, he does argue that there is an 
equally strong “[…] set of worldwide interactions and processes that confirm and enhance the 
sovereign state.”391 Armstrong (1998) argues that it is important to see states within an international 
context “[…] as a social as well as a self-seeking entity, with its membership of international society 
helping to confirm and preserve its identity as a state, while also shaping and changing it.”392 He 
goes on stating that there are two mutually affecting, but not conflictual processes, in which states 
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act: globalisation and the social interaction between states.393 Departing from writers such as Dunne, 
Hurrell and Wendt, Armstrong (1998) combines two theoretical approaches in International 
Relations: the ´international society tradition´ and ´constructivism´.394 Constructivists are concerned 
with the idea that “[…] states are not structurally or exogenously given but constructed by 
historically contingent interactions.”395 It is argued that states can only be understood in its 
international context, in that the “[…] state’s social interaction with other members of international 
society is not only responsible for the helping to form, confirm and reinforce its juridical identity; it 
plays a part in all other aspects of the state’s identity formation.”396 It is within the international 
society that social practises occur, and the result is that “[…] states both inhabit and create”397 `the 
social universe´. Within this social universe, states produce knowledge and `best practices´ by 
interacting with each other, which results in states constructing “[…] new modalities of statehood.”398 
States must be seen as actors who have “[…] identities, interests, rationality, and so on”399, and it is 
important to note that it is through the dynamics of both the domestic and international levels that 
“[…] the identities and interests through which those incentives and worlds are created.”400 
As a point of departure, the ability of IOs to shape states’ behaviour, as explained by Finnemore and 
Sikkink (1998), through their role as organisational platform for norm entrepreneurs401, will be 
presented. Finnemore & Sikkink (1999) argue that a norm does not appear out of thin air; instead, 
agents “[…] having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community”402 
construct them. In order for the emerging norms to reach the international society, international agents 
need organisational platforms, mostly exemplified in IOs, from which they can promote the norm.403 
Some organisational platforms are constructed specifically for the purpose of promoting a specific 
norm, while other “[…] entrepreneurs work from standing international organizations that have 
purpose and agendas other than simply promoting one specific norm.”404 
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As an example of an IO effectively working as an organisational platform is the World Health 
Organisation (hereafter referred to as WHO), working for international standardisation of health care. 
In 1948, the WHO was established as a body within the United Nations, working within the field of 
international monitoring.405 One of the reasons for this was, as argued by Zacher (1999), that “[…] 
health surveillance was relatively weak between the 1940s and 1980s, today there is a renewed 
interest in international cooperation.”406 Furthermore, as argued by Zacher (1999), as a consequence 
of globalisation and an increase in mobility of both people and goods, “[…] health risk anywhere can 
pose a threat everywhere.”407  Today, WHO is responsible for “[…] providing leadership on global 
health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standard.”408 WHO can 
therefore be seen as an important organisational platform, from which norm entrepreneurs can 
promote norms of international standards of health.  
The “[…] institutional framework for capitalist production”409 can be seen as another example of a 
function of states being affected by international actors. According to Wendt (1994), capitalism can 
historically be defined as a territorial phenomenon, “[…] as competition drove them to expand 
overseas through trade and investment, however, they created a demand for international rules and 
regulations.”410 According to Wendt (1994), this led to states creating networks of regimes due to the 
demand “[…] for international rules and regulation”411, and today these very regimes do not merely 
regulate prices of certain behaviour, they also “[…] embody a degree of collective identity.”412 
Although recognising that the enforcements of these regimes is still a weakness, Wendt (1994) argues, 
“[…] there are emerging sanctioning systems that enable us to speak of an internationalization of 
political authority.”413 
Following this discussion, some of the theoretical stances on how international actors affect states’ 
authority, we argue that states’ are increasingly being affected by the international society in which 
they interact. However, as argued by Armstrong (1998), states are both shaping and changing this 
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international society. IOs plays a part in promoting international norms through their role as 
organisational platforms, and thereby they affect states’ authority.   
However, as Wendt (1994) argues, due to globalisation there has been structural changes to the 
Westphalian state system. This has resulted in the emergence of “international-states” – a condition 
where states take part in constructing of the “social universe” they inhabit. The social universe is thus 
created on a local and global level. Therefore, since states and IOs are mutually constituting it is not 
possible to objectively assess if and how IOs affect states’ authority. It is also important to note that 
one should not talk of objective implications when entering into the international society, but rather 
that states are affected differently depending on the issue and context in which they deal with the 
international society.  
Together with the main body of this project, the assessment of the effects of outsourcing the provision 
of security to private military and security companies, an interesting issue to investigate further could 
be the effects on states’ authority when international actors employ private military and security 
companies on behalf of states’.  
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